Annotation Summary for Anderson

In Uncategorized

The revolution of the scientific revolution was not a method of studies or a tktk of discoveries but a centering of the way of thinking?, present in classical times

 

Annotation Summary for: 12091012 diana ucla 291A reading andersonAnderson2

 

Page 2,

given the many monumental testaments of thnnks that cover!he temple grounds. Delphi represented a whole science-a whole way of knowirlg-that existed to control a very uncertain wurld.

 

Page 3,

Comment: premier exemplar of the real.

 

Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):

Comment: years to learn to describe the phenomenal world in radically different terms. The revo

lution of the scientific revolution was not a method of study or a set of discov

eries but the centering of a way of thinking, present even in classical times, thatsaw  the phenomenal world as  material, determinant, and ordered by lawlike regularities

 

Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):

Comment: Objective empiricism is usually coupled with reductionism.

 

Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):

Comment: Reduc

tionism, when applied to knowledge field~. holds that at base there is a single

knowledge field (usually physics) to which all others ultimately reduce.

 

Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):

Comment: The vision of n material, determinant, and dependable phenomenal world

has been quite productive.

 

Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):

Comment: Reductionism is the foundation for the unity-of-science hypothesis.

 

Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):

Comment: The goal of science is to develop representations of the empirical world that

~n~ble w to ex~!ain and p~·edic.t phenomena that areofinterest, whether they

l~e 10 t~e don1.mn of phystcs, b1ology, psychology, sociology or communica

tiOn sc1ence. S1mply ~tated. the aim of empiricalscience is to provide objective

information about the world. (p. 202)

 

Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):

Comment: world views

of two contrasting knowledge practices, those of objective empiricism and

hermeneutic empiricism.

 

Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):

Comment:  beliefin the unity of tl1e  phenomenal world. This belief holds that all  phenomena

anything that is the proper object of inquiry- have the same foundations.

 

Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):

Comment: Objective empiricism typically assumes phenomena that are naturally configured, that are perceptually accessible but autonomous of the perception,and that reside in a stable network of relationships in  whkh their characteristics andactions are dependent on other phenomena. Such phenomena are independent objects of analysis

 

Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):

Comment: objective empiricism may also~ coupled with determinism.

 

Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):

Comment: M;~ter-ial detemti

Clll

tl <1

••

Each phenomenon is both a consequent of some prior phenomenon and the

agent of some subsequent one. 2 Determinism works to exclude explanations

based on chance, fate, or choice from the pantheon of valid claim. 3

 

Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "nism I I" "lr'  .'Of]  I w  lh ,II re·  r l o ,m, I l'S ., Clll tl <1 •• "

Comment: nism

I I"

"lr'  .'Of]  I

w  lh

,II re·  r l o

,m, I

l'S .,

Clll

tl <1

••

 

Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):

Comment: Empiricism of this sort is often materialist or at least holds to a materialistcriterion for evaluating claims. Materialism advances solid material bodies as the

 

Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):

Comment: expression of them in our daily affairs.

 

Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):

Comment: the notion of a common foundation  of phenomena is generaUy abandoned.

 

Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):

Comment: Theoretically, in this world, there is a point where the practice

of science disappears as it is replaced by codified knowledge (i.e., science is no

longer the practice of discovery but the reproduction of what is already known).

 

Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Popper"

Comment: Popper

 

Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: ""Matter can ... transcend itself, by producing mind, purpose and a world of theproducts of the human mindn (p. 1 1). "The products of the human mind," theproper objects of hermeneutic analysis; represent, then, real  phenomena of a different sortinnowayidentkaltothebiological,eJectrochemkalprocessesthatsupport them. "

Comment: "Matter can ... transcend itself, by producing mind, purpose and a world of theproducts of the human mindn (p. 1 1). "The products of the human mind," theproper objects of hermeneutic analysis; represent, then, real  phenomena of a different sortinnowayidentkaltothebiological,eJectrochemkalprocessesthatsupport them.

 

Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "One may. for exlUilple, discover how memory works by studying large protein molecules, but one will not consequently discover the stuff of memories (Hess,1988)."

Comment: One may. for exlUilple, discover how memory works by studying

large protein molecules, but one will not consequently discover the stuff of

memories (Hess,1988).

 

Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: " Hermeneuticempiricism assumes a world of multiple domains of phenomena with no common foundation. Human engagement of the phenomenal world occurs across these multiple domains. A typical formulation (further developed near the end of this chapter) would recognize us to be first of all material entities in a physical world, but also living organisms giving expression to the principles of animation and sentience, and finally the creators and inhabitants of the domain of the sign. "

Comment:  Hermeneuticempiricism assumes a world of multiple domains of phenomena with no common foundation. Human engagement of the phenomenal world occurs across these multiple domains. A typical formulation (further developed near the end of this chapter) would recognize us to be first of all material entities in a physical world, but also living organisms giving expression to the principles of animation and sentience, and finally the creators and inhabitants of the domain of the sign.

 

Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Hermeneutic empiricism places an interpretive accom plishment between the object of analysis and the subject of the claim."

Comment: Hermeneutic empiricism places an interpretive accom

plishment between the object of analysis and the subject of the claim.

 

Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "The assumption of multiple domains, however formulated, strikes at the ideas of a common foundation for all phenomena, reductionism, and the unityof-science hypothesis. Taking these in reverse order, hermeneutic empiricism gives over the domain of material phenomena to physics and chemistry, givesover the domain of animation and sentience to biological studies, and retains for itself  the domain  of signification and  meaning.  The unity  of science  is rejected because perfect knowledge in one dornain does little to advance knowledge  in another."

Comment: The assumption of multiple domains, however formulated, strikes at the ideas of a common foundation for all phenomena, reductionism, and the unityof-science hypothesis. Taking these in reverse order, hermeneutic empiricism gives over the domain of material phenomena to physics and chemistry, givesover the domain of animation and sentience to biological studies, and retains for itself  the domain  of signification and  meaning.  The unity  of science  is rejected because perfect knowledge in one dornain does little to advance knowledge  in another.

 

Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: " It  is  a  world  of material  facts  and interpretiveachievements  made  mraningful  in  human action. Claim  is  a  truth-making performance and science is part of the action. "

Comment:  It  is  a  world  of material  facts  and interpretiveachievements  made  mraningful  in  human action. Claim  is  a  truth-making performance and science is part of the action.

 

 

Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Reductionism is often replaced by what is sometimes called "downward causation.""

Comment: Reductionism is often replaced by what is sometimes called "downward

causation."

 

Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Four issues have (l) the criterion of the real, (2) the unity of the phenomenal world (and of its fields of study), (3) causality and agency, and (4) constructionism in reality and knowledge. We shall take them up in that order."

Comment: Four issues have

(l) the criterion of the real, (2) the

unity of the phenomenal world (and of its fields of study), (3) causality and

agency, and (4) constructionism in reality and knowledge. We shall take them

up in that order.

 

Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "The material and biological are brought into being as fields of knowledge after the creation of the semiotic."

Comment: The material and biological are brought into

being as fields of knowledge after the creation of the semiotic.

 

Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: " relatively autonomous t1clds of knowledge production, all of which  contribute to  the  lives  that  can be lived As material, biological,  and semiotic entities we are the intersection of these three domains and give concrete "

Comment:  relatively autonomous t1clds of knowledge production, all of which  contribute to  the  lives  that  can be lived As material, biological,  and semiotic entities we are the intersection of these three domains and give concrete

 

Page 5, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "inability to point to unique physical states that define mental products uncertainty. In the social sci ences, the most common method is an appeal to Dperatioualism An object is operationally defllled according to the method oflts measurement. an ideological stance is materialized in the formulation of the argument about its interpretatkm (Hirsch, (Consider 'Xleological stance" op· erationally defined as a set of material, discursive practices of argument.)"

Comment: inability to point to unique physical states that define

mental products

uncertainty. In the social sci

ences, the most common method is an appeal to Dperatioualism

An object is

operationally defllled according to the method oflts measurement.

an ideological stance is materialized in the formulation of

the argument about its interpretatkm (Hirsch,

(Consider 'Xleological stance" op·

erationally defined as a set of material, discursive practices of argument.)

 

Page 5, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "source of and the central threat to 'alidclaim.) imaginative in our thinking."

Comment: source of and the central threat to 'alidclaim.)

imaginative in our thinking.

 

Page 5, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "most popular solution materialist criterion. begins axiomatically with the claim that matter exists.'1 Simpie materialism of this sort runs into ditllcultywhen we begin to extend the domain of the real to things with which I have only the slightest conta<:t."

Comment: most popular solution

materialist criterion.

begins axiomatically with the claim that matter exists.'1

Simpie materialism of this sort runs into ditllcultywhen we begin to extend

the domain of the real to things with which I have only the slightest conta<:t.

 

Page 5, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Ouriotcrest Is kindled because these operations "stand for" the material reality of the larger wnstruct. The weakness of operationalism and its ethnographic and critical analo~ gies is that these solutions do oot independently vcrify the material reality of what we really want In talk about."

Comment: Ouriotcrest Is kindled

because these operations "stand for" the material reality of the larger wnstruct.

The weakness of operationalism and its ethnographic and critical analo~

gies is that these solutions do oot independently vcrify the material reality of

what we really want In talk about.

 

Page 5, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "George Gale ( 1979) offers a reasonably direct test: objects are real if"they interact wi!b and thm; share the same world with us" ( Ideological stances, gratifications, and personality characteristics a1e thus conjectures that can be reasonably held as real because we can establish condi tions where we expe(:t them to interact with that portion of the material world that we can engage direct!}' conjectures"

Comment: George

Gale ( 1979) offers a reasonably direct test: objects are real if"they interact wi!b

and thm; share the same world with us" (

Ideological stances, gratifications, and personality characteristics a1e thus

conjectures that can be reasonably held as real because we can establish condi

tions where we expe(:t them to interact with that portion of the material world

that we can engage direct!}'

conjectures

 

Page 5, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Nonetheless, the operational definilion, !he authentic arg:tmem, and the documentation of material praclices do presmt a reality test of some sort."

Comment: Nonetheless, the operational definilion, !he authentic arg:tmem, and the

documentation of material praclices do presmt a reality test of some sort.

 

Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "must conform to professional practices and can be- critically assessed in that performance. This conformation may be aU that we can hope for as we leave the domain of acts we can observe and objects we can handle to enter tbe domain of the mind."

Comment: must conform to professional practices and can be- critically assessed in that

performance. This conformation may be aU that we can hope for as we leave the

domain of acts we can observe and objects we can handle to enter tbe domain

of the mind.

 

Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Objectivism has been  a typical substftution. Objectivism is a form of material realism  that holds to  an independent. determinant, and knowable  world  in which a clear distinction can be drawn between the object and an individual'scognitive grasp of it "

Comment: Objectivism has been  a typical substftution. Objectivism is a form of material realism  that holds to  an independent. determinant, and knowable  world  in which a clear distinction can be drawn between the object and an individual'scognitive grasp of it

 

Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: ""some pttmanent,ahlstorical matrix or framework to which we can ul!iml'ltely appeal in determining truth, reality. goodness, or rightness""

Comment: "some pttmanent,ahlstorical matrix or framework to which

we can ul!iml'ltely appeal in determining

truth, reality. goodness, or rightness"

 

Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Objectivity refers ro any set of practice~ in which the "effect of the subject" -the public consequenceiO of any particular mind in its particular time and place-is sought to be reduced. The measure Df objectivity ls intersub_jective agreement. Objectivity becomes a product of proper method" Kerlinger (1973) more practically recommends thai we "think of degreesDf objectivity as dt!grees of extent of agreement among observers""

Comment: Objectivity refers ro any set of

practice~ in which the "effect of the subject" -the public consequenceiO of any

particular mind in its particular time and place-is sought to be reduced.

The measure Df objectivity ls intersub_jective agreement.

Objectivity becomes a product of proper

method"

Kerlinger (1973) more practically recommends thai we "think

of degreesDf objectivity as dt!grees of extent of agreement among observers"

 

Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "l.ocke (l690ll974) wrote that the  human mind was a blank slate  upon which experience  traced its  message.  Genuine  knowledge  was  empirical .1nd  only empirical Cause is not empirical hut must be understood in the relationship between two empirical events. Hume events. Kant (178111964) offered two intuitions {space and time) and 12 categories of a priori understanding (unity, plurality, totality, re.Uity, negation, limitation, substanti ality, causality, reciprocal a~tion, possibility, existence, and necessity). for Husse:rl (1929/l964) aU knowledge begins in experience but comes to its fruition in the eidetic, intentional grasp of human consciousness. Finally Peirce (c. 189711960) holds that the phenomen11l world is understood in lerms oi a three-part rela!iDnship between the sign, its ideational objecl,and our recogni tion of the relationship between the two."

Comment: l.ocke (l690ll974) wrote that the  human mind was a blank slate  upon which experience  traced its  message.  Genuine  knowledge  was  empirical .1nd  only empirical

Cause is not empirical

hut must be understood in the relationship between two empirical events.

Hume

events. Kant

(178111964) offered two intuitions {space and time) and 12 categories of a priori

understanding (unity, plurality, totality, re.Uity, negation, limitation, substanti

ality, causality, reciprocal a~tion, possibility, existence, and necessity). for

Husse:rl (1929/l964) aU knowledge begins in experience but comes to its fruition

in the eidetic, intentional grasp of human consciousness. Finally Peirce (c.

189711960) holds that the phenomen11l world is understood in lerms oi a

three-part rela!iDnship between the sign, its ideational objecl,and our recogni

tion of the relationship between the two.

 

Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "freld  of human understanding."

Comment: freld  of human understanding.

 

Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Objectivity in the vrorldS. of theoretical terms and critkal texts (linguistic or b<-havioral) hangs on the doc!rine of meaning realism. Meaning realism is litl!e more than the concept of literal meaning-that"

Comment: Objectivity in the vrorldS. of theoretical terms and critkal texts (linguistic

or b<-havioral) hangs on the doc!rine of meaning realism. Meaning realism is

litl!e more than the concept of literal meaning-that

 

Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "("

Comment: (

 

Page 7, Highlight (Green):

Content: "veridkality"

Comment: veridkality

 

Page 7, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "In the case of scieotifk {and Kccmpetent" comm{)nsense) terms fur the phenomenal world, the idea~ tiona! ohje.:t is also an empirical object. This identity is the representational character of signs. Meaning realism is the basis of any claim -concerning the absolute character of content. Claims that a narrative is "violent," "pornographic;' "informative:' or "entertainment" are all realist dalms because they are based solely on the characteristics of the content. Meaning realism is alsQ the underlying belief of all sign-based (language, pictures, etc.) objective tests. Therefure, if tbe test is to be objecti<e, its meaning cannot depend upon the reade<"

Comment: In the case of scieotifk

{and Kccmpetent" comm{)nsense) terms fur the phenomenal world, the idea~

tiona! ohje.:t is also an empirical object. This identity is the representational

character of signs.

Meaning realism is the basis of any claim -concerning the absolute character

of content. Claims that a narrative is "violent," "pornographic;' "informative:'

or "entertainment" are all realist dalms because they are based solely on the

characteristics of the content.

Meaning realism is alsQ the underlying belief of all sign-based (language,

pictures, etc.) objective tests.

Therefure, if tbe test is to be objecti<e, its meaning cannot depend upon the

reade<

 

Page 7, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "reade< Objectivism, Autonomous and anonymous forces and conditions (not identifrnble with any exclusive subjective act) work to produce a common human consciousness with particular expressions much like the genetic code produces different individuals of the smne species."

Comment: reade<

Objectivism,

Autonomous and anonymous forces and

conditions (not identifrnble with any exclusive subjective act) work to produce

a common human consciousness with particular expressions much like the

genetic code produces different individuals of the smne species.

 

Page 7, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Contemporary objectivism How does language affect what we e:perieuce What is the role of the a priori-what experience (Chisholm, 1982)? How does language affect How se-cure is the doctrine of meaning rt'alism ( Quine,1953/196l/l980)?l!"

Comment: Contemporary objectivism

How does language affect what we e:perieuce

What is the role of the a priori-what

experience (Chisholm, 1982)? How does language affect

How se-cure is the doctrine of meaning

rt'alism ( Quine,1953/196l/l980)?l!

 

Page 7, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Objedivity, as we have seen, is a protection aga.inst tbe biases of the indWiduaL"

Comment: Objedivity, as we have seen, is a protection aga.inst tbe biases of the indWiduaL

 

Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "persistent resistance to sdentism {the claim that all knowledge is scientific knowledge}. Hermeneutics ix the practice and study of in!erprelation."

Comment: persistent resistance to sdentism {the claim that all knowledge is scientific knowledge}.

Hermeneutics ix the practice and study

of in!erprelation.

 

Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Objectivism daims that these facts are determinants of all valid denotative meaning revealed by the telttual object itself; subjectivism claims that they are the resource of a valid meaning r~veakd from a given subjectivi1y. achievement. Facts are the product of culturahmd sociological processes, not a reading of their essential character."

Comment: Objectivism daims that

these facts are determinants of all valid denotative meaning revealed by the

telttual object itself; subjectivism claims that they are the resource of a valid

meaning r~veakd from a given subjectivi1y.

achievement. Facts

are the product of culturahmd sociological processes, not a reading of their

essential character.

 

Page 8, Line Drawing (Black)

 

Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Thefirstmoveofthegeneral form is to separate the material from thesocial,and then to realize that in the social reality i!< a conferred status. What becomes. rea), then-in the sense that it can be known-requires an interpretive act that punctuates the infinite process that will become our history. That interpretive act creates the "'data" -the objectified elements of the social world-we consider to be real."

Comment: Thefirstmoveofthegeneral form is to separate the material from thesocial,and

then to realize that in the social reality i!< a conferred status.

What becomes. rea), then-in the sense that it can be

known-requires an interpretive act that punctuates the infinite process that

will become our history. That interpretive act creates the "'data" -the objectified

elements of the social world-we consider to be real.

 

Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "There is an independent and singular material world that gives rise to ph.yskal and ideational phenomena that are naturally defined. These phenomena are autonomotts and ahistorical in their reality. The obiects and entities of this material world eJCist in determinant relationships th~ persist across time and place. 4) Language (as well as any unambiguous sign) is ill itself· reterential and its references to phenomena can be tr~d."

Comment: There is an independent and singular material world that gives rise to ph.yskal

and ideational phenomena that are naturally defined.

These

phenomena are autonomotts and ahistorical in their reality.

The obiects and entities of this material world eJCist in determinant

relationships th~ persist across time and place.

4) Language (as well as any unambiguous sign)

is ill itself· reterential and its references to phenomena can be tr~d.

 

Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "This move declares the real to be dependent on the particular cultural stralegies that constitute the social life ~n which their reality may appear.  multiple, contingent. and  subjugated epistemologies "subjugated" notes the dependence of the real on human accomplishment."

Comment: This move declares the real to be dependent on the particular cultural

stralegies that constitute the social life ~n which their reality may appear.

multiple, contingent. and  subjugated epistemologies

"subjugated" notes the dependence of the real on human accomplishment.

 

Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "the understanding of human behavior as a communal achievt"ment fmmded in communication practices and full of sig nificance."

Comment: the understanding of human behavior as a

communal achievt"ment fmmded in communication practices and full of sig

nificance.

 

Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "language (or any sign usage) can be representational ln that its points of reference can be used to map the characteristics of objects and entities. {Example:"

Comment: language (or any sign usage) can

be representational ln that its points of reference can be used to map the

characteristics of objects and entities. {Example:

 

Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: ""The human sciences-sciences of the spirit-arephilological sciences (as part of and at the same time common to all ofthcm-thewonW {p. 161)."

Comment: "The human sciences-sciences of the spirit-arephilological sciences (as part

of and at the same time common to all ofthcm-thewonW {p. 161).

 

Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "All l<nowledge of wltiL'1ll reaht; knowlr<lg<> from p11•·1imll!r paims [);(view."

Comment: All l<nowledge of wltiL'1ll reaht;

knowlr<lg<> from

p11•·1imll!r paims [);(view.

 

Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "world consciously or uncons!:iously to um· venal ~culturo! values" and lo select out those relationships whkh are signifi· cant fur us. {pp.Sl-82}"

Comment: world consciously or uncons!:iously to um·

venal ~culturo! values" and lo select out those relationships whkh are signifi·

cant fur us. {pp.Sl-82}

 

Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Social knowledge is local and culturally particular, although the cultural locale may be very large."

Comment: Social knowledge is local and culturally particular, although the cultural locale

may be very large.

 

Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "thedaim that inquiry is part of the practice by which the real becomes the rea!."

Comment: thedaim that inquiry is part of

the practice by which the real becomes the rea!.

 

Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Foucault (1987) argues what must be done to move inquiry from the reactionary mode to enlightenment:"

Comment: Foucault

(1987) argues what must be done to move inquiry from the reactionary mode

to enlightenment:

 

Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Reality is no longer anonymous. It is the collection of signature prod~cts that result-for Foucault-from power relationships, but for Wittgenstem from living action. ."

Comment: Reality is no longer anonymous. It is the collection of signature prod~cts that

result-for Foucault-from power relationships, but for Wittgenstem from

living action.

.

 

Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "hermeneutic reality states I hat those of us m the profession of inquiry make choices as to the reality we both serve an~ studY:"

Comment: hermeneutic reality states I hat those of us m the

profession of inquiry make choices as to the reality we both serve an~ studY:

 

Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Personal choices of an  empowered member of a strategic collective may be positi~ned to account for  the choices of others both within the collective and beyond 1t. Both the empm-.--ennent and the consequence are collecth>e enterprises. "

Comment: Personal choices of an  empowered member of a strategic collective may be positi~ned to account for  the choices of others both within the collective and beyond 1t. Both the empm-.--ennent and the consequence are collecth>e enterprises.

 

 

Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "The epistemological significance  of interpretation is  simply that  i! is  .a  human accomplishment. By that I mean that once it is agreed that a human aduevementparticipates in reality, the essential break v,'iib. fnundational empiricism has been made. It is on this essential characteristic that f justify the global use of the tenn-"

Comment: The epistemological significance  of interpretation is  simply that  i! is  .a  human accomplishment. By that I mean that once it is agreed that a human aduevementparticipates in reality, the essential break v,'iib. fnundational empiricism has been made. It is on this essential characteristic that f justify the global use of the tenn-

 

Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "study of public oplnion-espedally those studies that claim its  ('r&>Xislence in the public-confirms its status as real.) "

Comment: study of public oplnion-espedally those studies that claim its  ('r&>Xislence in the public-confirms its status as real.)

 

Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "the explanatory object of any.th.eoryisalwaysconsidered real in some fashion whether by its persisting materiality  or by the  momentary effort  of the theorisE.  Our first  task, consequently, for  understanding the real within any theon• is to ascertain what  the th~ory intends to ell:plain.17 'Then the question to ask i;what reality criteria does thts explanatory target pass-what must be beJieved for its existence? "

Comment: the explanatory object of any.th.eoryisalwaysconsidered real in some fashion whether by its persisting materiality  or by the  momentary effort  of the theorisE.  Our first  task, consequently, for  understanding the real within any theon• is to ascertain what  the th~ory intends to ell:plain.17 'Then the question to ask i;what reality criteria does thts explanatory target pass-what must be beJieved for its existence?

 

 

Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "materialisS/objectivist criterion of the real. All of the elements are present: independence, autonomy, anonymity, a historicity, determinacy, referentiality, and representation, as wen as operationalism and objectivism. mystery:' he presents his own demomtration of the interpretive tum. He offers a lived reality that is multiple, cm1tingent, subordinate (made meaningful), subjective, shot through with agency, accomplished discursively, and account able for its insights."

Comment: materialisS/objectivist

criterion of the real. All of the elements are present: independence, autonomy,

anonymity, a historicity, determinacy, referentiality, and representation, as wen

as operationalism and objectivism.

mystery:' he presents his own demomtration of the interpretive tum. He

offers a lived reality that is multiple, cm1tingent, subordinate (made meaningful),

subjective, shot through with agency, accomplished discursively, and account

able for its insights.

 

Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: ",pananimism-the notion that ail things have an animatespirit-u.n~fied the pheno~nal world"

Comment: ,pananimism-the notion that ail things have an animatespirit-u.n~fied the pheno~nal world

 

Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Cartesian mind-body duality was part of the work that directed .science toward the mate~ial and allowed the hwnan &oul to retain consciousness and agency. This ~Iutton was an uneasy political compromise between the growing power of saence ~nd the gradual~)' declining power of metaphysics and religion. The boundartes of the matertal became the demarcation zone of what was science and what was not."

Comment: Cartesian

mind-body duality was part of the work that directed .science toward the

mate~ial and allowed the hwnan &oul to retain consciousness and agency. This

~Iutton was an uneasy political compromise between the growing power of

saence ~nd the gradual~)' declining power of metaphysics and religion. The

boundartes of the matertal became the demarcation zone of what was science

and what was not.

 

Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Mystery is u:>fd here in both straight and delinquEnt senses, to denote both a way of expressing ar:d a ~rof eJ<pt""riendng what I willcailthe rockn roll of social life. Goodall ( 1991}"

Comment: Mystery is u:>fd here in

both straight and delinquEnt senses, to denote both a way of expressing ar:d

a ~rof eJ<pt""riendng what I willcailthe rockn roll of social life.

Goodall ( 1991}

 

Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "realm  of science  was enlarged  from  astro-nomy  and  falling  fxxlies  to include  human  action  and consciousness as  well as  life itself.  Part of the success of science was the demo-nstration  that  much of what were  thought t<>  be  metaphysical  pr-ocesses  were indeed material ones. In the very recent past of the first half of the 20th century, elements ~f sc~ence claimed it  a~, assening that what can be  >"alid  knowledge mllS!  he menhfic koowledge(eptsternology naturalized).11le realm of knowl edge be<:ame  unified. and along with it  the realm of the phenomenal world. "

Comment: realm  of science  was enlarged  from  astro-nomy  and  falling  fxxlies  to include  human  action  and consciousness as  well as  life itself.  Part of the success of science was the demo-nstration  that  much of what were  thought t<>  be  metaphysical  pr-ocesses  were indeed material ones. In the very recent past of the first half of the 20th century, elements ~f sc~ence claimed it  a~, assening that what can be  >"alid  knowledge mllS!  he menhfic koowledge(eptsternology naturalized).11le realm of knowl

edge be<:ame  unified. and along with it  the realm of the phenomenal world.

 

Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "The uni!y or disunity of sde1oce depmJs on t)llf ~;Qn~tualil.ation of the phenomenal world."

Comment: The uni!y or disunity of sde1oce depmJs on t)llf ~;Qn~tualil.ation of the

phenomenal world.

 

Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "We are also living organisms giving expression to the principles of ecologi~ cal animation. The foremost of those principles is our ability to initiate ratherthan to be solely the consequent of change."

Comment: We are also living organisms giving expression to the principles of ecologi~ cal animation. The foremost of those principles is our ability to initiate ratherthan to be solely the consequent of change.

 

Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "The conceptions of an ordered nature and a unilkd science belong naturally together. If there ls some uhimate and unfque onkr underlying the apparent divenity and disorder of nature then the point of science slrould be to tell !he one story that expresses this order. Dupre"

Comment: The conceptions of an ordered nature and a unilkd science belong naturally

together. If there ls some uhimate and unfque onkr underlying the apparent

divenity and disorder of nature then the point of science slrould be to tell !he

one story that expresses this order.

Dupre

 

Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Living entitiesdiange because  change  defin~ them  as  living.  The second domain  of ourexistence, then, is  the biologkaL 1tis within the biological that we  find act. And in act, our experience as a player-an entity that can modify the outcome of thefurces working upon it-comes into existence. Explanation appropria1e to thebiological domain must make a dear space for the exception, the evolutionarysport, the genetic mutation, the .spontaneous appearance. which can change the character of the relationships within this domain. "

Comment: Living entitiesdiange because  change  defin~ them  as  living.  The second domain  of ourexistence, then, is  the biologkaL 1tis within the biological that we  find act. And in act, our experience as a player-an entity that can modify the outcome of thefurces working upon it-comes into existence. Explanation appropria1e to thebiological domain must make a dear space for the exception, the evolutionarysport, the genetic mutation, the .spontaneous appearance. which can change the character of the relationships within this domain.

 

 

Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "sociological unity in which disciplines attempt to legitimate lines of inquiry by designating them as "scientific,""

Comment: sociological unity in which disciplines attempt to legitimate lines of inquiry

by designating them as "scientific,"

 

Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "meth odological unity in the "mathematkiza.tion" of evidence and claim that helps us to better understand both the pre~ence and vigorous defense of quantifiCation and statisticalanaly&-is, which 1$ math's common appearance in communication studies."

Comment: meth

odological unity in the "mathematkiza.tion" of evidence and claim that helps us

to better understand both the pre~ence and vigorous defense of quantifiCation

and statisticalanaly&-is, which 1$ math's common appearance in communication

studies.

 

Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Once we step off the platform of belief that human life is  expfained with  no reference  to the mental, we  leave  foundational  materialism behind. When we reject a ·world shaped only by universal, anonymous forces, we  walk away from the foundational detenninism of an ultimate order. In doing so, we  reject thecornerstones of scientific unity. This rejection takes us into a work! where thereis something other than an "infinitely divisible substance" organized in a "singleuniversal order," although there may that as well. The belief in a phenomenal world that has multiple domains implicates a belief in multiple epislemologies, the adoption of acriticat stance tnward sdence,and the production of a methodological pluralism."

Comment: Once we step off the platform of belief that human life is  expfained with  no reference  to the mental, we  leave  foundational  materialism behind. When we reject a ·world shaped only by universal, anonymous forces, we  walk away from the foundational detenninism of an ultimate order. In doing so, we  reject thecornerstones of scientific unity. This rejection takes us into a work! where thereis something other than an "infinitely divisible substance" organized in a "singleuniversal order," although there may that as well.

The belief in a phenomenal world that has multiple domains implicates a belief in multiple epislemologies, the adoption of acriticat stance tnward sdence,and the production of a methodological pluralism.

 

Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "We cannot understand human life hy studylng only the mal erial and the biological. Weinhabltyet another universe, the nniverse of the sign."

Comment: We cannot understand human life hy studylng only

the mal erial and the biological. Weinhabltyet another universe, the nniverse of

the sign.

 

Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Popper's 1977) formulation of multiple domaiP.s posits three worlds: ( 1) the world of physical objects including nonsentient living objects; (2) the world of sertlience and subjective experience; and (3) the world of !he human mind, particularly language and argument (p. 16). We are first of all material entities in a physical world. We are as governed by the grand laws of mass and energy, structure and relationships as any other physical entil;~ The first domain oflmman lifu,then, is the material. The mal erial dom,tin provides the evidem.:e of our existence. lt e._~tabll>hes many of the brute facts of that existence. Experience in this domain is as a nonsensate element in a system of mass and energy. Explanation fitted to this domain ;;:an take advan tage of its regularities, relative lack of exceptions, and ibe similitude of inde pendence that those regularities give to our observations and our descriptions of those observations."

Comment: Popper's

1977) formulation of multiple domaiP.s posits three

worlds: ( 1) the world of physical objects including nonsentient living objects;

(2) the world of sertlience and subjective experience; and (3) the world of !he

human mind, particularly language and argument (p. 16).

We are first of all material entities in a physical world. We are as governed

by the grand laws of mass and energy, structure and relationships as any other

physical entil;~ The first domain oflmman lifu,then, is the material. The mal erial

dom,tin provides the evidem.:e of our existence. lt e._~tabll>hes many of the brute

facts of that existence. Experience in this domain is as a nonsensate element in

a system of mass and energy. Explanation fitted to this domain ;;:an take advan

tage of its regularities, relative lack of exceptions, and ibe similitude of inde

pendence that those regularities give to our observations and our descriptions

of those observations.

 

Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "arise. It is the universe of our communities, of our collectivities, of our relationships bet¥.-een self and other. This universe is the semiotk domain."

Comment: arise. It is the universe of our communities, of our collectivities, of our

relationships bet¥.-een self and other. This universe is the semiotk domain.

 

Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "The semiotic domain is characterized by the principle of siguiftcation and the- process of communication."

Comment: The semiotic domain is characterized by the

principle of siguiftcation and the- process of communication.

 

Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Signifi· cation liberates us from the ongoing presenl by creating a pa~t and a future within the realm of human action."

Comment: Signifi·

cation liberates us from the ongoing presenl by creating a pa~t and a future

within the realm of human action.

 

Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "articipant observation under the objectivist criterion is  meaningfully different {action is self-evident. observation isneutral, language is  referential, description is  representational, subjectivity is suppressed) from  participantobse.-vation under the hermeneutic criterion (action  must be  interpreted, ob~rvation depends on  perspective,  language isrhetorical, description is political, objectivity is denierl}-"

Comment: articipant observation under the objectivist criterion is  meaningfully different {action is self-evident. observation isneutral, language is  referential, description is  representational, subjectivity is suppressed) from  participantobse.-vation under the hermeneutic criterion (action  must be  interpreted, ob~rvation depends on  perspective,  language isrhetorical, description is political, objectivity is denierl}-

 

Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: " in a very shortened fonn, the argument states that our ways of knowing the material world (the wodd of objects andell:istence) will be inadequate fur the production of knowledge about the semiotic. There is not, therefOre, a single science but multiple sciences {"

Comment:  in a very shortened fonn, the argument states that our ways of knowing the material world (the wodd of objects andell:istence) will be inadequate fur the production of knowledge about the semiotic. There is not, therefOre, a single science but multiple sciences {

 

Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Each of these epistemologies wili necessarily need to develop their own criteria ofthe reai,their bases of validity, even their separate logics, as wen as the utilities of their claim."

Comment: Each of these epistemologies wili necessarily need to develop their own

criteria ofthe reai,their bases of validity, even their separate logics, as wen as the

utilities of their claim.

 

Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Multiple methodologies are a necessary consequence of multiple epis temologies because methodology is a "method ofknowlng:' the technique of knm-.1edge production. The technique of knowledge production must be driven by what counts as knowledge."

Comment: Multiple methodologies are a necessary consequence of multiple epis

temologies because methodology is a "method ofknowlng:' the technique of

knm-.1edge production. The technique of knowledge production must be driven

by what counts as knowledge.

 

Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "use of "multiple methodologies" in a .single study?"

Comment: use of "multiple methodologies" in a

.single study?

 

Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "method of knowing, what counts as warranted evidence in claim-remains thesame.n Jn somecases, the call for "mu!tiple methods" is politically motivated as a rooptingmove to deny a  difkrence or to entail legitimation,"

Comment: method of knowing, what counts as warranted evidence in claim-remains thesame.n Jn somecases, the call for "mu!tiple methods" is politically motivated as a rooptingmove to deny a  difkrence or to entail legitimation,

 

Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "thatthere is noepistemologkal position that is immune from critical attack."

Comment: thatthere is noepistemologkal

position that is immune from critical attack.

 

Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "It is the inside character of !he attack that leads us to conclusions of chaos in inquiry (or fermentinthefield}. The angels are divided. There is no sacred; it is all profane.:w"

Comment: It is the inside character of !he attack that

leads us to conclusions of chaos in inquiry (or fermentinthefield}. The angels

are divided. There is no sacred; it is all profane.:w

 

Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "hypolhesis of the disunity of .science allows us to more productive!;understand this postmodern critical stance.Indeed if the struggle is to define a cenler on which to stand, then part of that elfurt has to be to establish one's own domain and the limits of the other"

Comment: hypolhesis of the disunity of .science allows us to more productive!;understand this postmodern critical stance.Indeed if the struggle is to define a cenler on which to stand, then part of that elfurt has to be to establish one's own domain and the limits of the other

 

Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: " One need not wholly reject either materialism or determinism to endorse mufiiple epistemologies. "

Comment:  One need not wholly reject either materialism or determinism to endorse mufiiple epistemologies.

 

Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: " Establishment science  must  be sufficiently  delegitimized to produce the space of alternatives. Quantificalion and statistical analysis will  come under attack to break  the methodological  hegemony of a matliematkal ideology. "

Comment:  Establishment science  must  be sufficiently  delegitimized to produce the space of alternatives. Quantificalion and statistical analysis will  come under attack to break  the methodological  hegemony of a matliematkal ideology.

 

 

Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Theory is often .silent on the issue of materialism. Theories !hatmotivate the use of s;:ales, behavioral roding or case studies represent objectivistextensions of the materialist criterion. Such theories are interim theories thata\-"'ail  the breakthrough that wm  describe the connection ben-."een  brain .states and mental  activity"

Comment: Theory is often .silent on the issue of materialism.

Theories !hatmotivate the use of s;:ales, behavioral roding or case studies represent objectivistextensions of the materialist criterion. Such theories are interim theories thata\-"'ail  the breakthrough that wm  describe the connection ben-."een  brain .states and mental  activity

 

Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "These are the moves of separation and identity.ll"

Comment: These are the moves of separation and identity.ll

 

Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "On the other hand, theories that locate their descriptions in a col!ecth·e enterprise such as society or cult me or fanguage or action look l'lt the material consequences of nonmaterial agents (Giddens,"

Comment: On the other hand, theories that locate their descriptions in a col!ecth·e

enterprise such as society or cult me or fanguage or action look l'lt the material

consequences of nonmaterial agents (Giddens,

 

Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Methodologies are here defined as the set of conventionalized practices that marks the membership of schoL1rsh!p,"

Comment: Methodologies are here defined as the set of conventionalized practices that

marks the membership of schoL1rsh!p,

 

Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Both are deterministic."

Comment: Both

are deterministic.

 

Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "~urrent behav:iortaaion on the basis of some prior, manipulatable state. Non deterministic theories require some form of agency or uncaused cause."

Comment: ~urrent behav:iortaaion on the basis of some prior, manipulatable state. Non

deterministic theories require some form of agency or uncaused cause.

 

Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "further one moves away from materialism and determinism, the less tenable is the argument for the unity of science."

Comment: further one moves away from materialism and determinism, the less

tenable is the argument for the unity of science.

 

Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Both open systems and agency remove  us from  deterministic argument. An open-system argument involves the acceptance of an uncaused cause, an act ofcreation, or an intrinsically unexplainable initial condition, Agency involve5 an un- (or atlea~t under-}determinedchoiceand as a characteristic of the individual posits "the ability to do otherwise." All such causes, conditions, choices, or a bill ties must be irredudbk for a nondetermintstkargument to be tru!y present. 23"

Comment: Both open systems and agency remove  us from  deterministic argument. An open-system argument involves the acceptance of an uncaused cause, an act ofcreation, or an intrinsically unexplainable initial condition, Agency involve5 an un- (or atlea~t under-}determinedchoiceand as a characteristic of the individual posits "the ability to do otherwise." All such causes, conditions, choices, or a bill

ties must be irredudbk for a nondetermintstkargument to be tru!y present. 23

 

Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Causality and its IISSQCi.ational relatives are at the center of all theories in traditional science arguments except the purely onto logical ones (i.e., questions of what is)."

Comment: Causality and its IISSQCi.ational relatives are at the

center of all theories in traditional science arguments except the purely onto

logical ones (i.e., questions of what is).

 

Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "re<:Dgnition of association in a pauerned seqt1ence allaws the analyst to anticipate outcomes {to predict} and to imenlionally accomplish (to manipulate and conlrol}."

Comment: re<:Dgnition of association in a

pauerned seqt1ence allaws the analyst to anticipate outcomes {to predict} and

to imenlionally accomplish (to manipulate and conlrol}.

 

Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Agency and open-system arguments greatly im:rcase the "'Otk of the ana· lyst and reduce enalrtk power."

Comment: Agency and open-system arguments greatly im:rcase the "'Otk of the ana·

lyst and reduce enalrtk power.

 

Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "aU things have an explanation beyond the silnple observation of their existence."

Comment: aU

things have an explanation beyond the silnple observation of their existence.

 

Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Exphmat ion IS 11c1thcr redm:t1vc (moving toward a finite set of pri!Kiples that cover all o.:cnrreoccs ), nor progressive (a claim that more closely approximales that finite ret of principles}. Explanation is local not transcendent."

Comment: Exphmat ion

IS 11c1thcr redm:t1vc (moving toward a finite set of pri!Kiples that cover all

o.:cnrreoccs ), nor progressive (a claim that more closely approximales that finite

ret of principles}. Explanation is local not transcendent.

 

Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "cause must be recognized, perhaps in difficult ;vays-motivate~ the profussional aclivity of inquiry. It also establishes the primacy of the analyst in the fidd Df knowledge. Layprople cannot know as the professianal can."

Comment: cause must be recognized, perhaps in difficult ;vays-motivate~ the profussional

aclivity of inquiry. It also establishes the primacy of the analyst in the fidd Df

knowledge. Layprople cannot know as the professianal can.

 

Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Theories that are classically causal hang on Mill's principles of necessity (if no X-agent, then no ¥-consequence) and sufficiency (if X, then always Y)."

Comment: Theories that are classically causal hang on Mill's principles of necessity (if no

X-agent, then no ¥-consequence) and sufficiency (if X, then always Y).

 

Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Most argue a wnditional relationship where the appearance of the <~gent incwaseH !he likelihood of ({lf .~cts a probability concernin~) !l1e apJXar ance of the consequent."

Comment: Most argue a wnditional relationship where the appearance of the

<~gent incwaseH !he likelihood of ({lf .~cts a probability concernin~) !l1e apJXar

ance of the consequent.

 

Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "importance of chaos theory is that it breaks the' connection between determinism and prediction."

Comment: importance of chaos theory is that it breaks the' connection

between determinism and prediction.

 

Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "V."ha1makes a throry deterministic is  the causal chain that explains the elementof inierest."

Comment: V."ha1makes a throry deterministic is  the causal chain that explains the elementof inierest.

 

Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Chaos theories <~:llow the analyst to ten  us a fragmentary but true story ofwhat h(lppened without bcing abfe  to tell  us:  what will happen,  incompleteness and postdiction are  necessary characteristics of chaotic theories. "

Comment: Chaos theories <~:llow the analyst to ten  us a fragmentary but true story ofwhat h(lppened without bcing abfe  to tell  us:  what will happen,  incompleteness and postdiction are  necessary characteristics of chaotic theories.

 

Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: " fs  there a supervenient relationship between the material, the biological, and the cognitive realmsof human activity  (ls  each of the subsequent realms an expression  of the previous one}?  If so, then constructionist activities are a  screen for what is actually happening. U not, lhen constructionist activities are their own proper object of inquiry."

Comment:  fs  there a supervenient relationship between the material, the biological, and the cognitive realmsof human activity  (ls  each of the subsequent realms an expression  of the previous one}?  If so, then constructionist activities are a  screen for what is actually happening. U not, lhen constructionist activities are their own proper object of inquiry.

 

Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "constructionism is !he basis fur considering reality to be multiple, contingent, and subordinate"

Comment: constructionism is !he basis fur considering reality to be multiple,

contingent, and subordinate

 

Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Semiotic processes are considered to play an active role in reality conslmctlon in three ways: by punctuation, by semiosis, and b)• extension."

Comment: Semiotic processes are considered to play an active role in reality conslmctlon

in three ways: by punctuation, by semiosis, and b)• extension.

 

Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Many of the contemporary theories in communication depend on some belief in the constructed nature of reality and knowledge"

Comment: Many of the contemporary theories in communication depend on some belief

in the constructed nature of reality and knowledge

 

Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "presumption that reality is pr("S{'ntcd to us in a continuous llheit vuriahle stream of exchange rather tinn in discrete en!iti~s."

Comment: presumption that reality

is pr("S{'ntcd to us in a continuous llheit vuriahle stream of exchange rather tinn

in discrete en!iti~s.

 

Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Reality cunstmclion references acts nf human creation (and also the human engagl'mcnt of fC"J!ity"

Comment: Reality cunstmclion references acts nf human creation (and also the human

engagl'mcnt of fC"J!ity

 

Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "that bring into existence circumstances of the same force as self-presenting events."

Comment: that bring into

existence circumstances of the same force as self-presenting events.

 

Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Most  constructionist punctuation claims are used in explanations of the processe.~ of perception (rn-gnitive lheories) or of the ro!cofl.mguage as a realityconstruction device (hermeneutic theoric~}. "

Comment: Most  constructionist punctuation claims are used in explanations of the processe.~ of perception (rn-gnitive lheories) or of the ro!cofl.mguage as a realityconstruction device (hermeneutic theoric~}.

 

Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "punctua!ion stands against the claim of self-presenting"

Comment: punctua!ion stands against the claim of self-presenting

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Signiflersare, therefore, said to "float  {Barthes, 1974). The action that contains them to a particular referentiality is constitutive. "

Comment: Signiflersare, therefore, said to "float  {Barthes, 1974). The action that contains them to a particular referentiality is constitutive.

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "events and argues jpstead that reality is, at the very least, a composite of encoding and decoding."

Comment: events and argues jpstead that reality is, at the very least, a composite of encoding

and decoding.

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Semiosis  is  the method and moment in  which an event is recognized l'IS meaningful. It is the moment (and the methods of attaining that moment) when a  perception (a mental event with  significance) enters into its potential <Is  an agent of action."

Comment: Semiosis  is  the method and moment in  which an event is recognized l'IS meaningful. It is the moment (and the methods of attaining that moment) when a  perception (a mental event with  significance) enters into its potential <Is  an agent of action.

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Edmund Husseri's (l90i/1970) philosophy of intentional consciousness has been cited both as a cornerstone of modern hermeneutics (Mueller- Vollmer, 1990) and as the source for the science of phenomenological insight (Lanigan,"

Comment: Edmund Husseri's (l90i/1970) philosophy of intentional consciousness has

been cited both as a cornerstone of modern hermeneutics (Mueller- Vollmer,

1990) and as the source for the science of phenomenological insight (Lanigan,

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "~ 988). Fvr ~usserl, thereala~sesin the spatial, temporal relationships of the egom the matenal world. What IS  real is  materialized in intentional action. Genuineknowledge ensues 1101 from the external, objective ~tudy of!he materia! but from the reflexive analysis of the intentional relationship. "

Comment: ~ 988). Fvr ~usserl, thereala~sesin the spatial, temporal relationships of the egom the matenal world. What IS  real is  materialized in intentional action. Genuineknowledge ensues 1101 from the external, objective ~tudy of!he materia! but from the reflexive analysis of the intentional relationship.

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: " content is the factual fOundation for the production of an interpreted (or <~ctivated} text. The agency of content is not its facts, however; it is  the produced text. Most ofthese explanations emanate from  hermeneutic camps, although .some  radical perceptual arguments make use of something similar. "

Comment:  content is the factual fOundation for the production of an interpreted (or <~ctivated} text. The agency of content is not its facts, however; it is  the produced text. Most ofthese explanations emanate from  hermeneutic camps, although .some  radical perceptual arguments make use of something similar.

 

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: ".transcendental phenomeoology"

Comment: .transcendental phenomeoology

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "phenomeoology by declaring a set of mbom, umversalmtenhons !hat allows a common human experience of reality and that is the true object of inquiry"

Comment: phenomeoology by declaring a set of

mbom, umversalmtenhons !hat allows a common human experience of reality

and that is the true object of inquiry

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Merleau- Pont}'"

Comment: Merleau- Pont}'

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "existentl~l (m!her .!han ~he :ranscendental} character of modern pheno· menol;'glcal analys1s. Tim ~1stential character redirects phenomenological analysis from a search for umversals to an examination of the intentionality of lived experience {Sobchack,"

Comment: existentl~l (m!her .!han ~he :ranscendental} character of modern pheno·

menol;'glcal analys1s. Tim ~1stential character redirects phenomenological

analysis from a search for umversals to an examination of the intentionality of

lived experience {Sobchack,

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "The radical break across these sorts of applications of the ;::onstitutive aspects of semiosis is the availability of a  true (or rightly interpreted) text As Qne  moves roward the radical  in hermeneutks, the objective text  recedes and imerpretive difference advances. In  the end, meaning becomes rhe!Drical andtexts nominated as true are so pJaced via the political rather than the veridical. "

Comment: The radical break across these sorts of applications of the ;::onstitutive aspects of semiosis is the availability of a  true (or rightly interpreted) text As Qne  moves roward the radical  in hermeneutks, the objective text  recedes and imerpretive difference advances. In  the end, meaning becomes rhe!Drical andtexts nominated as true are so pJaced via the political rather than the veridical.

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "experience {Sobchack, 1992). Phenomenology seeks to explicate the consciOUS!lf'S!i of human experience.  It  moves  from  a  description of the  experienced, to a  reduction of the expe:iendng !o its. genuine elements, to an interpretation of the experien.::er(Lamgan, 1991}. It lS  constructionist in that reality is the product of the humanconsciousness working {Le., intention"lly directed toward) the material. II  is not ~di~'>~ncratic, however,  in  that  an  explanatio11  must  be  developed  for  eachmdw1dual. Rather, consciousness is  subjective-an identifiable stance emanating from collective rules of intentionality. We arriv..-:, then, at an understandingof the subjective consciousness of lived experience, "

Comment: experience {Sobchack, 1992).

Phenomenology seeks to explicate the consciOUS!lf'S!i of human experience.  It  moves  from  a  description of the  experienced, to a  reduction of the expe:iendng !o its. genuine elements, to an interpretation of the experien.::er(Lamgan, 1991}. It lS  constructionist in that reality is the product of the humanconsciousness working {Le., intention"lly directed toward) the material. II  is not ~di~'>~ncratic, however,  in  that  an  explanatio11  must  be  developed  for  eachmdw1dual. Rather, consciousness is  subjective-an identifiable stance emanating from collective rules of intentionality. We arriv..-:, then, at an understandingof the subjective consciousness of lived experience,

 

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "fn no case, however,is semiosis considered to be under individual control."

Comment: fn no case, however,is semiosis considered to be under individual control.

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "governed by orga!Jic per-ceptual processes, the soci.11ization processes of cognitive structure  formalion, culturally  proce'lS<!ll  of subjectivity,  or the contextualization of action."

Comment: governed by orga!Jic per-ceptual processes, the soci.11ization processes

of cognitive structure  formalion, culturally  proce'lS<!ll  of subjectivity,  or the

contextualization of action.

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Harrison"

Comment: Harrison

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "the determinacy of texlual meaning is founded on tbe principle that "these signs standing in these relationships to one another in this context, can bear these possible interpretations bw not those"'"

Comment: the determinacy of texlual meaning is founded on tbe principle

that "these signs standing in these relationships to one another in this context,

can bear these possible interpretations bw not those"'

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "~merican pragmatism"

Comment: ~merican pragmatism

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Semiotic extension refers  to  the proposition that !he signified (e.g., what a word might stand for) is not a material object  (the word tree  does. nc>t  stand for a  tree24} bnt is  Itself another signinvoking another signified. "

Comment: Semiotic extension refers  to  the proposition that !he signified (e.g., what a word might stand for) is not a material object  (the word tree  does. nc>t  stand for a  tree24} bnt is  Itself another signinvoking another signified.

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "beetl characterized as forming a point of resistance to Brilish em piricism on the one hand (Roth. 1993) and Cartesianism on the other (Murphy;"

Comment: beetl characterized as forming a point of resistance to Brilish em

piricism on the one hand (Roth. 1993) and Cartesianism on the other (Murphy;

 

Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: ""'web of signifteance" appliH to all  sign  usage. "

Comment: "'web of signifteance" appliH to all  sign  usage.

 

Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "determinism-our presen-t state is the playing out of forces initiated in the first coming together of human society. "

Comment: determinism-our presen-t state is the playing out of forces initiated in the first coming together of human society.

 

Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Atomism give$ way to continuity, div«sitr to w1ity, discre1eness to intnrelation, isoktion to inter· actk>n. {pp.lQ-ll}"

Comment: Atomism give$ way to

continuity, div«sitr to w1ity, discre1eness to intnrelation, isoktion to inter·

actk>n. {pp.lQ-ll}

 

Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "inquiry as a practice of discovery. It requires the declaration of our ability either to resist (de Certeau, 1984} the demands of ideology through which resistance we can prodw:e a temporary individual or collective emancipation or to restructure ideology itself (Ape!, 1980) through which restructuring we can advance social justice (Habermasian communicative action) or simply produce a new set of emancipated and subjugated subjects (Fom:aultian change)."

Comment: inquiry as a

practice of discovery. It requires the declaration of our ability either to resist (de

Certeau, 1984} the demands of ideology through which resistance we can

prodw:e a temporary individual or collective emancipation or to restructure

ideology itself (Ape!, 1980) through which restructuring we can advance social

justice (Habermasian communicative action) or simply produce a new set of

emancipated and subjugated subjects (Fom:aultian change).

 

Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "The pragmatic notion of experience is one of interpenetration, an active interrelallonship in whkh experience arises out of action in the phenomenal world."

Comment: The pragmatic notion of experience is one of interpenetration, an active

interrelallonship in whkh experience arises out of action in the phenomenal

world.

 

Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: " humanagent cocreatinga reality with its own markings."

Comment:  humanagent cocreatinga reality with its own markings.

 

Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Pragmatism substitutes instead a method that begins with belief that is to be acted upon (and from which pragmatism establishes its name), the validation of intersubjectivity, and a line of attack that is multiple and 'aried."

Comment: Pragmatism substitutes instead a method that begins with belief that is to

be acted upon (and from which pragmatism establishes its name), the validation

of intersubjectivity, and a line of attack that is multiple and 'aried.

 

Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Knowledgeis  not a  passive discovery but an acknowledged  manner of acting  upon  the phenomenal world  (foas,  1993}.  As  Dewey  argues, there is  no  single  reality;instead, there are as  many realities as  there are acceptable epistemoiogicaf linesof action. "

Comment: Knowledgeis  not a  passive discovery but an acknowledged  manner of acting  upon  the phenomenal world  (foas,  1993}.  As  Dewey  argues, there is  no  single  reality;instead, there are as  many realities as  there are acceptable epistemoiogicaf linesof action.

 

 

Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "A long-standing debate ln philosophy focuses  on the  relative  prior status ofessence and existence."

Comment: A long-standing debate ln philosophy focuses  on the  relative  prior status ofessence and existence.

 

Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: " Determinism establishes essence as prior to existence: We are born into n world in which the future is already encoded in forces already in act inn. [n deterministic formulation..<;. essence determines existence. Constructionism adjusts this relationship by arguing that existence must be directly taken into account in any understanding of present reality."

Comment:  Determinism establishes essence as prior to existence: We are born into n world in which the future is already encoded in forces already in act inn. [n deterministic formulation..<;. essence determines existence. Constructionism adjusts this relationship by arguing that existence must be directly taken into account in any understanding of present reality.

 

Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "individualism is expressly denied)."

Comment: individualism is expressly

denied).

 

Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Knowledge is public accomplishment based on joint agreement not private inspiration."

Comment: Knowledge is

public accomplishment based on joint agreement not private inspiration.

 

Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "In constructionist formulations, existence at least mo_difies essence."

Comment: In constructionist formulations, existence at least

mo_difies essence.

 

Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Actional  constructionism takes  us  fur1her  down the existentialist  road, seei11g_  reality  as  the  product  of cultural  agents  acting in  the  world.26  Themeaning of all  things is  materialized  in  action. And action  is  nlwflys  a  local improvisation that is partia!ry representative of all pnssible improvisatio-ns."

Comment: Actional  constructionism takes  us  fur1her  down the existentialist  road, seei11g_  reality  as  the  product  of cultural  agents  acting in  the  world.26  Themeaning of all  things is  materialized  in  action. And action  is  nlwflys  a  local improvisation that is partia!ry representative of all pnssible improvisatio-ns.

 

Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Cultural constrttt:tionism works from the ll~<aJmptlon that one is hom into anongoing system of understanding that is cosmological i11  its effect, reat·hing intoevery aspect oflife. "

Comment: Cultural constrttt:tionism works from the ll~<aJmptlon that one is hom into anongoing system of understanding that is cosmological i11  its effect, reat·hing intoevery aspect oflife.

 

Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Reality is always historkil:ed (instantiated), exce85iVe (beyond an effective prediction and control), and :obundm1t {in production_)."

Comment: Reality is always historkil:ed (instantiated), exce85iVe (beyond an

effective prediction and control), and :obundm1t {in production_).

 

Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "In strict structuralist formulas. ideology is no different from "big bangw"

Comment: In strict structuralist formulas. ideology is no different from "big bangw

 

Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Action is  a creative perfurmance materializing institionaJized understandings. "

Comment: Action is  a creative perfurmance materializing institionaJized understandings.

 

Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "constructionism rdativizes knowl edge. It releases knowledge from any rock-bottom foundation of objective phenomena or unirusal experience and recognizesit a.s-asetofinsti tutionalized agreements."

Comment: constructionism rdativizes knowl

edge. It releases knowledge from any rock-bottom foundation of objective

phenomena or unirusal experience and recognizesit a.s-asetofinsti tutionalized

agreements.

 

Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Hermeneutic theories hold that reality is some composite of the material and the conscious and that human actiGn is both productive of and directed by that composition,"

Comment: Hermeneutic theories hold that reality is some composite of the material

and the conscious and that human actiGn is both productive of and directed by

that composition,

 

Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Knowledge is, therefore, always subjective (from a locatable-not a personal-position); there are no Archimedean points (not even this one) from which to move the universe."

Comment: Knowledge is, therefore, always subjective (from a

locatable-not a personal-position); there are no Archimedean points (not

even this one) from which to move the universe.

 

Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "By propos ing a semiotklconscioustmental domain whose fmmdation is romehow a hu man adllevemenl (whether by material practkes-strocturation, existentialist tbemies, reception criticism-or by inborn rharacteristks-Kant ian logic, phe nomenologicnl interpretation, Choms:kian linguistics, structuralist criticism), theorists craft new epistemological s1andards. for inquiry."

Comment: By propos

ing a semiotklconscioustmental domain whose fmmdation is romehow a hu

man adllevemenl (whether by material practkes-strocturation, existentialist

tbemies, reception criticism-or by inborn rharacteristks-Kant ian logic, phe

nomenologicnl interpretation, Choms:kian linguistics, structuralist criticism),

theorists craft new epistemological s1andards. for inquiry.

 

Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "h£>W do I manage the sureties of my life given the uncertainty of my knowledge)"

Comment: h£>W

do I manage the sureties of my life given the uncertainty of my knowledge)

 

Page 17, Highlight (Custom Color: #bf96ff):

Content: "material practkes-strocturation, existentialist tbemies, reception criticism-or by inborn rharacteristks-Kant ian logic, phe nomenologicnl interpretation, Choms:kian linguistics, structuralist criticism),"

Comment: material practkes-strocturation, existentialist

tbemies, reception criticism-or by inborn rharacteristks-Kant ian logic, phe

nomenologicnl interpretation, Choms:kian linguistics, structuralist criticism),

 

Page 17, Highlight (Custom Color: #ad88ff):

Content: " this diapter lws beenabout: What is  the reaU  And what is my koowledge of it? "

Comment:  this diapter lws beenabout: What is  the reaU  And what is my koowledge of it?

 

Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "Those standards may or may  not  break  with the determinism that commonly appears with materialism. The break with determinism requires acceptance of original creative events-event! that are their own explanation (eventssometimes derided as miracles, as  in  the Harris cartoon). Theories that offerunexplainable initial eonditions or acts of agency are nondetermioisticalthoughthey may be causal within the consequences of chance and clmice. (semiotic, phen() menologicaL pragmatic, cultural/critical, and actional}. These five faUatongthe essence-to-existence dimension with semiotic and phenomenolngicnl bcing expressed primarily on the essence-is-prior-to-action ;;ide and the pragmatic and ru:-lion<'l moving 1owatd the existence-pmvicle~-C'Ssena end."

Comment: Those standards may or may  not  break  with the determinism that commonly appears with materialism. The break with determinism requires acceptance of original creative events-event! that are their own explanation (eventssometimes derided as miracles, as  in  the Harris cartoon). Theories that offerunexplainable initial eonditions or acts of agency are nondetermioisticalthoughthey may be causal within the consequences of chance and clmice.

(semiotic, phen()

menologicaL pragmatic, cultural/critical, and actional}. These five faUatongthe

essence-to-existence dimension with semiotic and phenomenolngicnl bcing

expressed primarily on the essence-is-prior-to-action ;;ide and the pragmatic

and ru:-lion<'l moving 1owatd the existence-pmvicle~-C'Ssena end.

 

Page 17, Highlight (Custom Color: #bf96ff):

Content: "t  five  of these  conslructionist positions (semiotic,  phen()menologicaL pragmatic, cultural/critical, and actional}. "

Comment: t  five  of these  conslructionist positions (semiotic,  phen()menologicaL pragmatic, cultural/critical, and actional}.

 

Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: "In this chapter we have been looking at fuur issues: What is the real? What are thedomairnof reality! What is the structure of the reality domain(s}? And what are the soun:es of that structure?"

Comment: In this chapter we have been looking at fuur issues: What is the real? What are

thedomairnof reality! What is the structure of the reality domain(s}? And what

are the soun:es of that structure?

 

Page 17, Highlight (Custom Color: #bf96ff):

Content: "Vfe now have four tools by which 10 evaluate theories. Whal is !·he explana !nr}' objec! aml how i;; it held to be real~ In wh<1t son of domain does that ol~t exist? Vhat is the structural character of that domain? Does cret~tion or agency appear •.vi thin it,am:iif so,huwdDesit function~"

Comment: Vfe now have four tools by which 10 evaluate theories. Whal is !·he explana

!nr}' objec! aml how i;; it held to be real~ In wh<1t son of domain does that ol~t

exist? Vhat is the structural character of that domain? Does cret~tion or agency

appear •.vi thin it,am:iif so,huwdDesit function~

 

Page 18, Highlight (Yellow):

Content: " These  interrogations can be applied to any sort of theory: aesthetic,critical,ethical, literary, scientific. They all must hold something to be real in some wayw:ith some explanatory value which itself must obliterate or manage creation. "

Comment:  These  interrogations can be applied to any sort of theory: aesthetic,critical,ethical, literary, scientific. They all must hold something to be real in some wayw:ith some explanatory value which itself must obliterate or manage creation.

 

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Sent from my iPad. Please forgive typos.

 

Diana Ascher