The revolution of the scientific revolution was not a method of studies or a tktk of discoveries but a centering of the way of thinking?, present in classical times
Annotation Summary for: 12091012 diana ucla 291A reading andersonAnderson2
Page 2,
given the many monumental testaments of thnnks that cover!he temple grounds. Delphi represented a whole science-a whole way of knowirlg-that existed to control a very uncertain wurld.
Page 3,
Comment: premier exemplar of the real.
Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):
Comment: years to learn to describe the phenomenal world in radically different terms. The revo
lution of the scientific revolution was not a method of study or a set of discov
eries but the centering of a way of thinking, present even in classical times, thatsaw the phenomenal world as material, determinant, and ordered by lawlike regularities
Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):
Comment: Objective empiricism is usually coupled with reductionism.
Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):
Comment: Reduc
tionism, when applied to knowledge field~. holds that at base there is a single
knowledge field (usually physics) to which all others ultimately reduce.
Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):
Comment: The vision of n material, determinant, and dependable phenomenal world
has been quite productive.
Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):
Comment: Reductionism is the foundation for the unity-of-science hypothesis.
Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):
Comment: The goal of science is to develop representations of the empirical world that
~n~ble w to ex~!ain and p~·edic.t phenomena that areofinterest, whether they
l~e 10 t~e don1.mn of phystcs, b1ology, psychology, sociology or communica
tiOn sc1ence. S1mply ~tated. the aim of empiricalscience is to provide objective
information about the world. (p. 202)
Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):
Comment: world views
of two contrasting knowledge practices, those of objective empiricism and
hermeneutic empiricism.
Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):
Comment: beliefin the unity of tl1e phenomenal world. This belief holds that all phenomena
anything that is the proper object of inquiry- have the same foundations.
Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):
Comment: Objective empiricism typically assumes phenomena that are naturally configured, that are perceptually accessible but autonomous of the perception,and that reside in a stable network of relationships in whkh their characteristics andactions are dependent on other phenomena. Such phenomena are independent objects of analysis
Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):
Comment: objective empiricism may also~ coupled with determinism.
Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):
Comment: M;~ter-ial detemti
Clll
tl <1
••
Each phenomenon is both a consequent of some prior phenomenon and the
agent of some subsequent one. 2 Determinism works to exclude explanations
based on chance, fate, or choice from the pantheon of valid claim. 3
Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "nism I I" "lr' .'Of] I w lh ,II re· r l o ,m, I l'S ., Clll tl <1 •• "
Comment: nism
I I"
"lr' .'Of] I
w lh
,II re· r l o
,m, I
l'S .,
Clll
tl <1
••
Page 3, Highlight (Yellow):
Comment: Empiricism of this sort is often materialist or at least holds to a materialistcriterion for evaluating claims. Materialism advances solid material bodies as the
Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):
Comment: expression of them in our daily affairs.
Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):
Comment: the notion of a common foundation of phenomena is generaUy abandoned.
Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):
Comment: Theoretically, in this world, there is a point where the practice
of science disappears as it is replaced by codified knowledge (i.e., science is no
longer the practice of discovery but the reproduction of what is already known).
Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Popper"
Comment: Popper
Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: ""Matter can ... transcend itself, by producing mind, purpose and a world of theproducts of the human mindn (p. 1 1). "The products of the human mind," theproper objects of hermeneutic analysis; represent, then, real phenomena of a different sortinnowayidentkaltothebiological,eJectrochemkalprocessesthatsupport them. "
Comment: "Matter can ... transcend itself, by producing mind, purpose and a world of theproducts of the human mindn (p. 1 1). "The products of the human mind," theproper objects of hermeneutic analysis; represent, then, real phenomena of a different sortinnowayidentkaltothebiological,eJectrochemkalprocessesthatsupport them.
Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "One may. for exlUilple, discover how memory works by studying large protein molecules, but one will not consequently discover the stuff of memories (Hess,1988)."
Comment: One may. for exlUilple, discover how memory works by studying
large protein molecules, but one will not consequently discover the stuff of
memories (Hess,1988).
Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: " Hermeneuticempiricism assumes a world of multiple domains of phenomena with no common foundation. Human engagement of the phenomenal world occurs across these multiple domains. A typical formulation (further developed near the end of this chapter) would recognize us to be first of all material entities in a physical world, but also living organisms giving expression to the principles of animation and sentience, and finally the creators and inhabitants of the domain of the sign. "
Comment: Hermeneuticempiricism assumes a world of multiple domains of phenomena with no common foundation. Human engagement of the phenomenal world occurs across these multiple domains. A typical formulation (further developed near the end of this chapter) would recognize us to be first of all material entities in a physical world, but also living organisms giving expression to the principles of animation and sentience, and finally the creators and inhabitants of the domain of the sign.
Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Hermeneutic empiricism places an interpretive accom plishment between the object of analysis and the subject of the claim."
Comment: Hermeneutic empiricism places an interpretive accom
plishment between the object of analysis and the subject of the claim.
Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The assumption of multiple domains, however formulated, strikes at the ideas of a common foundation for all phenomena, reductionism, and the unityof-science hypothesis. Taking these in reverse order, hermeneutic empiricism gives over the domain of material phenomena to physics and chemistry, givesover the domain of animation and sentience to biological studies, and retains for itself the domain of signification and meaning. The unity of science is rejected because perfect knowledge in one dornain does little to advance knowledge in another."
Comment: The assumption of multiple domains, however formulated, strikes at the ideas of a common foundation for all phenomena, reductionism, and the unityof-science hypothesis. Taking these in reverse order, hermeneutic empiricism gives over the domain of material phenomena to physics and chemistry, givesover the domain of animation and sentience to biological studies, and retains for itself the domain of signification and meaning. The unity of science is rejected because perfect knowledge in one dornain does little to advance knowledge in another.
Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: " It is a world of material facts and interpretiveachievements made mraningful in human action. Claim is a truth-making performance and science is part of the action. "
Comment: It is a world of material facts and interpretiveachievements made mraningful in human action. Claim is a truth-making performance and science is part of the action.
Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Reductionism is often replaced by what is sometimes called "downward causation.""
Comment: Reductionism is often replaced by what is sometimes called "downward
causation."
Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Four issues have (l) the criterion of the real, (2) the unity of the phenomenal world (and of its fields of study), (3) causality and agency, and (4) constructionism in reality and knowledge. We shall take them up in that order."
Comment: Four issues have
(l) the criterion of the real, (2) the
unity of the phenomenal world (and of its fields of study), (3) causality and
agency, and (4) constructionism in reality and knowledge. We shall take them
up in that order.
Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The material and biological are brought into being as fields of knowledge after the creation of the semiotic."
Comment: The material and biological are brought into
being as fields of knowledge after the creation of the semiotic.
Page 4, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: " relatively autonomous t1clds of knowledge production, all of which contribute to the lives that can be lived As material, biological, and semiotic entities we are the intersection of these three domains and give concrete "
Comment: relatively autonomous t1clds of knowledge production, all of which contribute to the lives that can be lived As material, biological, and semiotic entities we are the intersection of these three domains and give concrete
Page 5, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "inability to point to unique physical states that define mental products uncertainty. In the social sci ences, the most common method is an appeal to Dperatioualism An object is operationally defllled according to the method oflts measurement. an ideological stance is materialized in the formulation of the argument about its interpretatkm (Hirsch, (Consider 'Xleological stance" op· erationally defined as a set of material, discursive practices of argument.)"
Comment: inability to point to unique physical states that define
mental products
uncertainty. In the social sci
ences, the most common method is an appeal to Dperatioualism
An object is
operationally defllled according to the method oflts measurement.
an ideological stance is materialized in the formulation of
the argument about its interpretatkm (Hirsch,
(Consider 'Xleological stance" op·
erationally defined as a set of material, discursive practices of argument.)
Page 5, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "source of and the central threat to 'alidclaim.) imaginative in our thinking."
Comment: source of and the central threat to 'alidclaim.)
imaginative in our thinking.
Page 5, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "most popular solution materialist criterion. begins axiomatically with the claim that matter exists.'1 Simpie materialism of this sort runs into ditllcultywhen we begin to extend the domain of the real to things with which I have only the slightest conta<:t."
Comment: most popular solution
materialist criterion.
begins axiomatically with the claim that matter exists.'1
Simpie materialism of this sort runs into ditllcultywhen we begin to extend
the domain of the real to things with which I have only the slightest conta<:t.
Page 5, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Ouriotcrest Is kindled because these operations "stand for" the material reality of the larger wnstruct. The weakness of operationalism and its ethnographic and critical analo~ gies is that these solutions do oot independently vcrify the material reality of what we really want In talk about."
Comment: Ouriotcrest Is kindled
because these operations "stand for" the material reality of the larger wnstruct.
The weakness of operationalism and its ethnographic and critical analo~
gies is that these solutions do oot independently vcrify the material reality of
what we really want In talk about.
Page 5, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "George Gale ( 1979) offers a reasonably direct test: objects are real if"they interact wi!b and thm; share the same world with us" ( Ideological stances, gratifications, and personality characteristics a1e thus conjectures that can be reasonably held as real because we can establish condi tions where we expe(:t them to interact with that portion of the material world that we can engage direct!}' conjectures"
Comment: George
Gale ( 1979) offers a reasonably direct test: objects are real if"they interact wi!b
and thm; share the same world with us" (
Ideological stances, gratifications, and personality characteristics a1e thus
conjectures that can be reasonably held as real because we can establish condi
tions where we expe(:t them to interact with that portion of the material world
that we can engage direct!}'
conjectures
Page 5, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Nonetheless, the operational definilion, !he authentic arg:tmem, and the documentation of material praclices do presmt a reality test of some sort."
Comment: Nonetheless, the operational definilion, !he authentic arg:tmem, and the
documentation of material praclices do presmt a reality test of some sort.
Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "must conform to professional practices and can be- critically assessed in that performance. This conformation may be aU that we can hope for as we leave the domain of acts we can observe and objects we can handle to enter tbe domain of the mind."
Comment: must conform to professional practices and can be- critically assessed in that
performance. This conformation may be aU that we can hope for as we leave the
domain of acts we can observe and objects we can handle to enter tbe domain
of the mind.
Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Objectivism has been a typical substftution. Objectivism is a form of material realism that holds to an independent. determinant, and knowable world in which a clear distinction can be drawn between the object and an individual'scognitive grasp of it "
Comment: Objectivism has been a typical substftution. Objectivism is a form of material realism that holds to an independent. determinant, and knowable world in which a clear distinction can be drawn between the object and an individual'scognitive grasp of it
Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: ""some pttmanent,ahlstorical matrix or framework to which we can ul!iml'ltely appeal in determining truth, reality. goodness, or rightness""
Comment: "some pttmanent,ahlstorical matrix or framework to which
we can ul!iml'ltely appeal in determining
truth, reality. goodness, or rightness"
Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Objectivity refers ro any set of practice~ in which the "effect of the subject" -the public consequenceiO of any particular mind in its particular time and place-is sought to be reduced. The measure Df objectivity ls intersub_jective agreement. Objectivity becomes a product of proper method" Kerlinger (1973) more practically recommends thai we "think of degreesDf objectivity as dt!grees of extent of agreement among observers""
Comment: Objectivity refers ro any set of
practice~ in which the "effect of the subject" -the public consequenceiO of any
particular mind in its particular time and place-is sought to be reduced.
The measure Df objectivity ls intersub_jective agreement.
Objectivity becomes a product of proper
method"
Kerlinger (1973) more practically recommends thai we "think
of degreesDf objectivity as dt!grees of extent of agreement among observers"
Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "l.ocke (l690ll974) wrote that the human mind was a blank slate upon which experience traced its message. Genuine knowledge was empirical .1nd only empirical Cause is not empirical hut must be understood in the relationship between two empirical events. Hume events. Kant (178111964) offered two intuitions {space and time) and 12 categories of a priori understanding (unity, plurality, totality, re.Uity, negation, limitation, substanti ality, causality, reciprocal a~tion, possibility, existence, and necessity). for Husse:rl (1929/l964) aU knowledge begins in experience but comes to its fruition in the eidetic, intentional grasp of human consciousness. Finally Peirce (c. 189711960) holds that the phenomen11l world is understood in lerms oi a three-part rela!iDnship between the sign, its ideational objecl,and our recogni tion of the relationship between the two."
Comment: l.ocke (l690ll974) wrote that the human mind was a blank slate upon which experience traced its message. Genuine knowledge was empirical .1nd only empirical
Cause is not empirical
hut must be understood in the relationship between two empirical events.
Hume
events. Kant
(178111964) offered two intuitions {space and time) and 12 categories of a priori
understanding (unity, plurality, totality, re.Uity, negation, limitation, substanti
ality, causality, reciprocal a~tion, possibility, existence, and necessity). for
Husse:rl (1929/l964) aU knowledge begins in experience but comes to its fruition
in the eidetic, intentional grasp of human consciousness. Finally Peirce (c.
189711960) holds that the phenomen11l world is understood in lerms oi a
three-part rela!iDnship between the sign, its ideational objecl,and our recogni
tion of the relationship between the two.
Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "freld of human understanding."
Comment: freld of human understanding.
Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Objectivity in the vrorldS. of theoretical terms and critkal texts (linguistic or b<-havioral) hangs on the doc!rine of meaning realism. Meaning realism is litl!e more than the concept of literal meaning-that"
Comment: Objectivity in the vrorldS. of theoretical terms and critkal texts (linguistic
or b<-havioral) hangs on the doc!rine of meaning realism. Meaning realism is
litl!e more than the concept of literal meaning-that
Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "("
Comment: (
Page 7, Highlight (Green):
Content: "veridkality"
Comment: veridkality
Page 7, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "In the case of scieotifk {and Kccmpetent" comm{)nsense) terms fur the phenomenal world, the idea~ tiona! ohje.:t is also an empirical object. This identity is the representational character of signs. Meaning realism is the basis of any claim -concerning the absolute character of content. Claims that a narrative is "violent," "pornographic;' "informative:' or "entertainment" are all realist dalms because they are based solely on the characteristics of the content. Meaning realism is alsQ the underlying belief of all sign-based (language, pictures, etc.) objective tests. Therefure, if tbe test is to be objecti<e, its meaning cannot depend upon the reade<"
Comment: In the case of scieotifk
{and Kccmpetent" comm{)nsense) terms fur the phenomenal world, the idea~
tiona! ohje.:t is also an empirical object. This identity is the representational
character of signs.
Meaning realism is the basis of any claim -concerning the absolute character
of content. Claims that a narrative is "violent," "pornographic;' "informative:'
or "entertainment" are all realist dalms because they are based solely on the
characteristics of the content.
Meaning realism is alsQ the underlying belief of all sign-based (language,
pictures, etc.) objective tests.
Therefure, if tbe test is to be objecti<e, its meaning cannot depend upon the
reade<
Page 7, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "reade< Objectivism, Autonomous and anonymous forces and conditions (not identifrnble with any exclusive subjective act) work to produce a common human consciousness with particular expressions much like the genetic code produces different individuals of the smne species."
Comment: reade<
Objectivism,
Autonomous and anonymous forces and
conditions (not identifrnble with any exclusive subjective act) work to produce
a common human consciousness with particular expressions much like the
genetic code produces different individuals of the smne species.
Page 7, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Contemporary objectivism How does language affect what we e:perieuce What is the role of the a priori-what experience (Chisholm, 1982)? How does language affect How se-cure is the doctrine of meaning rt'alism ( Quine,1953/196l/l980)?l!"
Comment: Contemporary objectivism
How does language affect what we e:perieuce
What is the role of the a priori-what
experience (Chisholm, 1982)? How does language affect
How se-cure is the doctrine of meaning
rt'alism ( Quine,1953/196l/l980)?l!
Page 7, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Objedivity, as we have seen, is a protection aga.inst tbe biases of the indWiduaL"
Comment: Objedivity, as we have seen, is a protection aga.inst tbe biases of the indWiduaL
Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "persistent resistance to sdentism {the claim that all knowledge is scientific knowledge}. Hermeneutics ix the practice and study of in!erprelation."
Comment: persistent resistance to sdentism {the claim that all knowledge is scientific knowledge}.
Hermeneutics ix the practice and study
of in!erprelation.
Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Objectivism daims that these facts are determinants of all valid denotative meaning revealed by the telttual object itself; subjectivism claims that they are the resource of a valid meaning r~veakd from a given subjectivi1y. achievement. Facts are the product of culturahmd sociological processes, not a reading of their essential character."
Comment: Objectivism daims that
these facts are determinants of all valid denotative meaning revealed by the
telttual object itself; subjectivism claims that they are the resource of a valid
meaning r~veakd from a given subjectivi1y.
achievement. Facts
are the product of culturahmd sociological processes, not a reading of their
essential character.
Page 8, Line Drawing (Black)
Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Thefirstmoveofthegeneral form is to separate the material from thesocial,and then to realize that in the social reality i!< a conferred status. What becomes. rea), then-in the sense that it can be known-requires an interpretive act that punctuates the infinite process that will become our history. That interpretive act creates the "'data" -the objectified elements of the social world-we consider to be real."
Comment: Thefirstmoveofthegeneral form is to separate the material from thesocial,and
then to realize that in the social reality i!< a conferred status.
What becomes. rea), then-in the sense that it can be
known-requires an interpretive act that punctuates the infinite process that
will become our history. That interpretive act creates the "'data" -the objectified
elements of the social world-we consider to be real.
Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "There is an independent and singular material world that gives rise to ph.yskal and ideational phenomena that are naturally defined. These phenomena are autonomotts and ahistorical in their reality. The obiects and entities of this material world eJCist in determinant relationships th~ persist across time and place. 4) Language (as well as any unambiguous sign) is ill itself· reterential and its references to phenomena can be tr~d."
Comment: There is an independent and singular material world that gives rise to ph.yskal
and ideational phenomena that are naturally defined.
These
phenomena are autonomotts and ahistorical in their reality.
The obiects and entities of this material world eJCist in determinant
relationships th~ persist across time and place.
4) Language (as well as any unambiguous sign)
is ill itself· reterential and its references to phenomena can be tr~d.
Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "This move declares the real to be dependent on the particular cultural stralegies that constitute the social life ~n which their reality may appear. multiple, contingent. and subjugated epistemologies "subjugated" notes the dependence of the real on human accomplishment."
Comment: This move declares the real to be dependent on the particular cultural
stralegies that constitute the social life ~n which their reality may appear.
multiple, contingent. and subjugated epistemologies
"subjugated" notes the dependence of the real on human accomplishment.
Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "the understanding of human behavior as a communal achievt"ment fmmded in communication practices and full of sig nificance."
Comment: the understanding of human behavior as a
communal achievt"ment fmmded in communication practices and full of sig
nificance.
Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "language (or any sign usage) can be representational ln that its points of reference can be used to map the characteristics of objects and entities. {Example:"
Comment: language (or any sign usage) can
be representational ln that its points of reference can be used to map the
characteristics of objects and entities. {Example:
Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: ""The human sciences-sciences of the spirit-arephilological sciences (as part of and at the same time common to all ofthcm-thewonW {p. 161)."
Comment: "The human sciences-sciences of the spirit-arephilological sciences (as part
of and at the same time common to all ofthcm-thewonW {p. 161).
Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "All l<nowledge of wltiL'1ll reaht; knowlr<lg<> from p11•·1imll!r paims [);(view."
Comment: All l<nowledge of wltiL'1ll reaht;
knowlr<lg<> from
p11•·1imll!r paims [);(view.
Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "world consciously or uncons!:iously to um· venal ~culturo! values" and lo select out those relationships whkh are signifi· cant fur us. {pp.Sl-82}"
Comment: world consciously or uncons!:iously to um·
venal ~culturo! values" and lo select out those relationships whkh are signifi·
cant fur us. {pp.Sl-82}
Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Social knowledge is local and culturally particular, although the cultural locale may be very large."
Comment: Social knowledge is local and culturally particular, although the cultural locale
may be very large.
Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "thedaim that inquiry is part of the practice by which the real becomes the rea!."
Comment: thedaim that inquiry is part of
the practice by which the real becomes the rea!.
Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Foucault (1987) argues what must be done to move inquiry from the reactionary mode to enlightenment:"
Comment: Foucault
(1987) argues what must be done to move inquiry from the reactionary mode
to enlightenment:
Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Reality is no longer anonymous. It is the collection of signature prod~cts that result-for Foucault-from power relationships, but for Wittgenstem from living action. ."
Comment: Reality is no longer anonymous. It is the collection of signature prod~cts that
result-for Foucault-from power relationships, but for Wittgenstem from
living action.
.
Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "hermeneutic reality states I hat those of us m the profession of inquiry make choices as to the reality we both serve an~ studY:"
Comment: hermeneutic reality states I hat those of us m the
profession of inquiry make choices as to the reality we both serve an~ studY:
Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Personal choices of an empowered member of a strategic collective may be positi~ned to account for the choices of others both within the collective and beyond 1t. Both the empm-.--ennent and the consequence are collecth>e enterprises. "
Comment: Personal choices of an empowered member of a strategic collective may be positi~ned to account for the choices of others both within the collective and beyond 1t. Both the empm-.--ennent and the consequence are collecth>e enterprises.
Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The epistemological significance of interpretation is simply that i! is .a human accomplishment. By that I mean that once it is agreed that a human aduevementparticipates in reality, the essential break v,'iib. fnundational empiricism has been made. It is on this essential characteristic that f justify the global use of the tenn-"
Comment: The epistemological significance of interpretation is simply that i! is .a human accomplishment. By that I mean that once it is agreed that a human aduevementparticipates in reality, the essential break v,'iib. fnundational empiricism has been made. It is on this essential characteristic that f justify the global use of the tenn-
Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "study of public oplnion-espedally those studies that claim its ('r&>Xislence in the public-confirms its status as real.) "
Comment: study of public oplnion-espedally those studies that claim its ('r&>Xislence in the public-confirms its status as real.)
Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "the explanatory object of any.th.eoryisalwaysconsidered real in some fashion whether by its persisting materiality or by the momentary effort of the theorisE. Our first task, consequently, for understanding the real within any theon• is to ascertain what the th~ory intends to ell:plain.17 'Then the question to ask i;what reality criteria does thts explanatory target pass-what must be beJieved for its existence? "
Comment: the explanatory object of any.th.eoryisalwaysconsidered real in some fashion whether by its persisting materiality or by the momentary effort of the theorisE. Our first task, consequently, for understanding the real within any theon• is to ascertain what the th~ory intends to ell:plain.17 'Then the question to ask i;what reality criteria does thts explanatory target pass-what must be beJieved for its existence?
Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "materialisS/objectivist criterion of the real. All of the elements are present: independence, autonomy, anonymity, a historicity, determinacy, referentiality, and representation, as wen as operationalism and objectivism. mystery:' he presents his own demomtration of the interpretive tum. He offers a lived reality that is multiple, cm1tingent, subordinate (made meaningful), subjective, shot through with agency, accomplished discursively, and account able for its insights."
Comment: materialisS/objectivist
criterion of the real. All of the elements are present: independence, autonomy,
anonymity, a historicity, determinacy, referentiality, and representation, as wen
as operationalism and objectivism.
mystery:' he presents his own demomtration of the interpretive tum. He
offers a lived reality that is multiple, cm1tingent, subordinate (made meaningful),
subjective, shot through with agency, accomplished discursively, and account
able for its insights.
Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: ",pananimism-the notion that ail things have an animatespirit-u.n~fied the pheno~nal world"
Comment: ,pananimism-the notion that ail things have an animatespirit-u.n~fied the pheno~nal world
Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Cartesian mind-body duality was part of the work that directed .science toward the mate~ial and allowed the hwnan &oul to retain consciousness and agency. This ~Iutton was an uneasy political compromise between the growing power of saence ~nd the gradual~)' declining power of metaphysics and religion. The boundartes of the matertal became the demarcation zone of what was science and what was not."
Comment: Cartesian
mind-body duality was part of the work that directed .science toward the
mate~ial and allowed the hwnan &oul to retain consciousness and agency. This
~Iutton was an uneasy political compromise between the growing power of
saence ~nd the gradual~)' declining power of metaphysics and religion. The
boundartes of the matertal became the demarcation zone of what was science
and what was not.
Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Mystery is u:>fd here in both straight and delinquEnt senses, to denote both a way of expressing ar:d a ~rof eJ<pt""riendng what I willcailthe rockn roll of social life. Goodall ( 1991}"
Comment: Mystery is u:>fd here in
both straight and delinquEnt senses, to denote both a way of expressing ar:d
a ~rof eJ<pt""riendng what I willcailthe rockn roll of social life.
Goodall ( 1991}
Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "realm of science was enlarged from astro-nomy and falling fxxlies to include human action and consciousness as well as life itself. Part of the success of science was the demo-nstration that much of what were thought t<> be metaphysical pr-ocesses were indeed material ones. In the very recent past of the first half of the 20th century, elements ~f sc~ence claimed it a~, assening that what can be >"alid knowledge mllS! he menhfic koowledge(eptsternology naturalized).11le realm of knowl edge be<:ame unified. and along with it the realm of the phenomenal world. "
Comment: realm of science was enlarged from astro-nomy and falling fxxlies to include human action and consciousness as well as life itself. Part of the success of science was the demo-nstration that much of what were thought t<> be metaphysical pr-ocesses were indeed material ones. In the very recent past of the first half of the 20th century, elements ~f sc~ence claimed it a~, assening that what can be >"alid knowledge mllS! he menhfic koowledge(eptsternology naturalized).11le realm of knowl
edge be<:ame unified. and along with it the realm of the phenomenal world.
Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The uni!y or disunity of sde1oce depmJs on t)llf ~;Qn~tualil.ation of the phenomenal world."
Comment: The uni!y or disunity of sde1oce depmJs on t)llf ~;Qn~tualil.ation of the
phenomenal world.
Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "We are also living organisms giving expression to the principles of ecologi~ cal animation. The foremost of those principles is our ability to initiate ratherthan to be solely the consequent of change."
Comment: We are also living organisms giving expression to the principles of ecologi~ cal animation. The foremost of those principles is our ability to initiate ratherthan to be solely the consequent of change.
Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The conceptions of an ordered nature and a unilkd science belong naturally together. If there ls some uhimate and unfque onkr underlying the apparent divenity and disorder of nature then the point of science slrould be to tell !he one story that expresses this order. Dupre"
Comment: The conceptions of an ordered nature and a unilkd science belong naturally
together. If there ls some uhimate and unfque onkr underlying the apparent
divenity and disorder of nature then the point of science slrould be to tell !he
one story that expresses this order.
Dupre
Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Living entitiesdiange because change defin~ them as living. The second domain of ourexistence, then, is the biologkaL 1tis within the biological that we find act. And in act, our experience as a player-an entity that can modify the outcome of thefurces working upon it-comes into existence. Explanation appropria1e to thebiological domain must make a dear space for the exception, the evolutionarysport, the genetic mutation, the .spontaneous appearance. which can change the character of the relationships within this domain. "
Comment: Living entitiesdiange because change defin~ them as living. The second domain of ourexistence, then, is the biologkaL 1tis within the biological that we find act. And in act, our experience as a player-an entity that can modify the outcome of thefurces working upon it-comes into existence. Explanation appropria1e to thebiological domain must make a dear space for the exception, the evolutionarysport, the genetic mutation, the .spontaneous appearance. which can change the character of the relationships within this domain.
Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "sociological unity in which disciplines attempt to legitimate lines of inquiry by designating them as "scientific,""
Comment: sociological unity in which disciplines attempt to legitimate lines of inquiry
by designating them as "scientific,"
Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "meth odological unity in the "mathematkiza.tion" of evidence and claim that helps us to better understand both the pre~ence and vigorous defense of quantifiCation and statisticalanaly&-is, which 1$ math's common appearance in communication studies."
Comment: meth
odological unity in the "mathematkiza.tion" of evidence and claim that helps us
to better understand both the pre~ence and vigorous defense of quantifiCation
and statisticalanaly&-is, which 1$ math's common appearance in communication
studies.
Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Once we step off the platform of belief that human life is expfained with no reference to the mental, we leave foundational materialism behind. When we reject a ·world shaped only by universal, anonymous forces, we walk away from the foundational detenninism of an ultimate order. In doing so, we reject thecornerstones of scientific unity. This rejection takes us into a work! where thereis something other than an "infinitely divisible substance" organized in a "singleuniversal order," although there may that as well. The belief in a phenomenal world that has multiple domains implicates a belief in multiple epislemologies, the adoption of acriticat stance tnward sdence,and the production of a methodological pluralism."
Comment: Once we step off the platform of belief that human life is expfained with no reference to the mental, we leave foundational materialism behind. When we reject a ·world shaped only by universal, anonymous forces, we walk away from the foundational detenninism of an ultimate order. In doing so, we reject thecornerstones of scientific unity. This rejection takes us into a work! where thereis something other than an "infinitely divisible substance" organized in a "singleuniversal order," although there may that as well.
The belief in a phenomenal world that has multiple domains implicates a belief in multiple epislemologies, the adoption of acriticat stance tnward sdence,and the production of a methodological pluralism.
Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "We cannot understand human life hy studylng only the mal erial and the biological. Weinhabltyet another universe, the nniverse of the sign."
Comment: We cannot understand human life hy studylng only
the mal erial and the biological. Weinhabltyet another universe, the nniverse of
the sign.
Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Popper's 1977) formulation of multiple domaiP.s posits three worlds: ( 1) the world of physical objects including nonsentient living objects; (2) the world of sertlience and subjective experience; and (3) the world of !he human mind, particularly language and argument (p. 16). We are first of all material entities in a physical world. We are as governed by the grand laws of mass and energy, structure and relationships as any other physical entil;~ The first domain oflmman lifu,then, is the material. The mal erial dom,tin provides the evidem.:e of our existence. lt e._~tabll>hes many of the brute facts of that existence. Experience in this domain is as a nonsensate element in a system of mass and energy. Explanation fitted to this domain ;;:an take advan tage of its regularities, relative lack of exceptions, and ibe similitude of inde pendence that those regularities give to our observations and our descriptions of those observations."
Comment: Popper's
1977) formulation of multiple domaiP.s posits three
worlds: ( 1) the world of physical objects including nonsentient living objects;
(2) the world of sertlience and subjective experience; and (3) the world of !he
human mind, particularly language and argument (p. 16).
We are first of all material entities in a physical world. We are as governed
by the grand laws of mass and energy, structure and relationships as any other
physical entil;~ The first domain oflmman lifu,then, is the material. The mal erial
dom,tin provides the evidem.:e of our existence. lt e._~tabll>hes many of the brute
facts of that existence. Experience in this domain is as a nonsensate element in
a system of mass and energy. Explanation fitted to this domain ;;:an take advan
tage of its regularities, relative lack of exceptions, and ibe similitude of inde
pendence that those regularities give to our observations and our descriptions
of those observations.
Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "arise. It is the universe of our communities, of our collectivities, of our relationships bet¥.-een self and other. This universe is the semiotk domain."
Comment: arise. It is the universe of our communities, of our collectivities, of our
relationships bet¥.-een self and other. This universe is the semiotk domain.
Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The semiotic domain is characterized by the principle of siguiftcation and the- process of communication."
Comment: The semiotic domain is characterized by the
principle of siguiftcation and the- process of communication.
Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Signifi· cation liberates us from the ongoing presenl by creating a pa~t and a future within the realm of human action."
Comment: Signifi·
cation liberates us from the ongoing presenl by creating a pa~t and a future
within the realm of human action.
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "articipant observation under the objectivist criterion is meaningfully different {action is self-evident. observation isneutral, language is referential, description is representational, subjectivity is suppressed) from participantobse.-vation under the hermeneutic criterion (action must be interpreted, ob~rvation depends on perspective, language isrhetorical, description is political, objectivity is denierl}-"
Comment: articipant observation under the objectivist criterion is meaningfully different {action is self-evident. observation isneutral, language is referential, description is representational, subjectivity is suppressed) from participantobse.-vation under the hermeneutic criterion (action must be interpreted, ob~rvation depends on perspective, language isrhetorical, description is political, objectivity is denierl}-
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: " in a very shortened fonn, the argument states that our ways of knowing the material world (the wodd of objects andell:istence) will be inadequate fur the production of knowledge about the semiotic. There is not, therefOre, a single science but multiple sciences {"
Comment: in a very shortened fonn, the argument states that our ways of knowing the material world (the wodd of objects andell:istence) will be inadequate fur the production of knowledge about the semiotic. There is not, therefOre, a single science but multiple sciences {
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Each of these epistemologies wili necessarily need to develop their own criteria ofthe reai,their bases of validity, even their separate logics, as wen as the utilities of their claim."
Comment: Each of these epistemologies wili necessarily need to develop their own
criteria ofthe reai,their bases of validity, even their separate logics, as wen as the
utilities of their claim.
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Multiple methodologies are a necessary consequence of multiple epis temologies because methodology is a "method ofknowlng:' the technique of knm-.1edge production. The technique of knowledge production must be driven by what counts as knowledge."
Comment: Multiple methodologies are a necessary consequence of multiple epis
temologies because methodology is a "method ofknowlng:' the technique of
knm-.1edge production. The technique of knowledge production must be driven
by what counts as knowledge.
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "use of "multiple methodologies" in a .single study?"
Comment: use of "multiple methodologies" in a
.single study?
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "method of knowing, what counts as warranted evidence in claim-remains thesame.n Jn somecases, the call for "mu!tiple methods" is politically motivated as a rooptingmove to deny a difkrence or to entail legitimation,"
Comment: method of knowing, what counts as warranted evidence in claim-remains thesame.n Jn somecases, the call for "mu!tiple methods" is politically motivated as a rooptingmove to deny a difkrence or to entail legitimation,
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "thatthere is noepistemologkal position that is immune from critical attack."
Comment: thatthere is noepistemologkal
position that is immune from critical attack.
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "It is the inside character of !he attack that leads us to conclusions of chaos in inquiry (or fermentinthefield}. The angels are divided. There is no sacred; it is all profane.:w"
Comment: It is the inside character of !he attack that
leads us to conclusions of chaos in inquiry (or fermentinthefield}. The angels
are divided. There is no sacred; it is all profane.:w
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "hypolhesis of the disunity of .science allows us to more productive!;understand this postmodern critical stance.Indeed if the struggle is to define a cenler on which to stand, then part of that elfurt has to be to establish one's own domain and the limits of the other"
Comment: hypolhesis of the disunity of .science allows us to more productive!;understand this postmodern critical stance.Indeed if the struggle is to define a cenler on which to stand, then part of that elfurt has to be to establish one's own domain and the limits of the other
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: " One need not wholly reject either materialism or determinism to endorse mufiiple epistemologies. "
Comment: One need not wholly reject either materialism or determinism to endorse mufiiple epistemologies.
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: " Establishment science must be sufficiently delegitimized to produce the space of alternatives. Quantificalion and statistical analysis will come under attack to break the methodological hegemony of a matliematkal ideology. "
Comment: Establishment science must be sufficiently delegitimized to produce the space of alternatives. Quantificalion and statistical analysis will come under attack to break the methodological hegemony of a matliematkal ideology.
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Theory is often .silent on the issue of materialism. Theories !hatmotivate the use of s;:ales, behavioral roding or case studies represent objectivistextensions of the materialist criterion. Such theories are interim theories thata\-"'ail the breakthrough that wm describe the connection ben-."een brain .states and mental activity"
Comment: Theory is often .silent on the issue of materialism.
Theories !hatmotivate the use of s;:ales, behavioral roding or case studies represent objectivistextensions of the materialist criterion. Such theories are interim theories thata\-"'ail the breakthrough that wm describe the connection ben-."een brain .states and mental activity
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "These are the moves of separation and identity.ll"
Comment: These are the moves of separation and identity.ll
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "On the other hand, theories that locate their descriptions in a col!ecth·e enterprise such as society or cult me or fanguage or action look l'lt the material consequences of nonmaterial agents (Giddens,"
Comment: On the other hand, theories that locate their descriptions in a col!ecth·e
enterprise such as society or cult me or fanguage or action look l'lt the material
consequences of nonmaterial agents (Giddens,
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Methodologies are here defined as the set of conventionalized practices that marks the membership of schoL1rsh!p,"
Comment: Methodologies are here defined as the set of conventionalized practices that
marks the membership of schoL1rsh!p,
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Both are deterministic."
Comment: Both
are deterministic.
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "~urrent behav:iortaaion on the basis of some prior, manipulatable state. Non deterministic theories require some form of agency or uncaused cause."
Comment: ~urrent behav:iortaaion on the basis of some prior, manipulatable state. Non
deterministic theories require some form of agency or uncaused cause.
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "further one moves away from materialism and determinism, the less tenable is the argument for the unity of science."
Comment: further one moves away from materialism and determinism, the less
tenable is the argument for the unity of science.
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Both open systems and agency remove us from deterministic argument. An open-system argument involves the acceptance of an uncaused cause, an act ofcreation, or an intrinsically unexplainable initial condition, Agency involve5 an un- (or atlea~t under-}determinedchoiceand as a characteristic of the individual posits "the ability to do otherwise." All such causes, conditions, choices, or a bill ties must be irredudbk for a nondetermintstkargument to be tru!y present. 23"
Comment: Both open systems and agency remove us from deterministic argument. An open-system argument involves the acceptance of an uncaused cause, an act ofcreation, or an intrinsically unexplainable initial condition, Agency involve5 an un- (or atlea~t under-}determinedchoiceand as a characteristic of the individual posits "the ability to do otherwise." All such causes, conditions, choices, or a bill
ties must be irredudbk for a nondetermintstkargument to be tru!y present. 23
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Causality and its IISSQCi.ational relatives are at the center of all theories in traditional science arguments except the purely onto logical ones (i.e., questions of what is)."
Comment: Causality and its IISSQCi.ational relatives are at the
center of all theories in traditional science arguments except the purely onto
logical ones (i.e., questions of what is).
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "re<:Dgnition of association in a pauerned seqt1ence allaws the analyst to anticipate outcomes {to predict} and to imenlionally accomplish (to manipulate and conlrol}."
Comment: re<:Dgnition of association in a
pauerned seqt1ence allaws the analyst to anticipate outcomes {to predict} and
to imenlionally accomplish (to manipulate and conlrol}.
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Agency and open-system arguments greatly im:rcase the "'Otk of the ana· lyst and reduce enalrtk power."
Comment: Agency and open-system arguments greatly im:rcase the "'Otk of the ana·
lyst and reduce enalrtk power.
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "aU things have an explanation beyond the silnple observation of their existence."
Comment: aU
things have an explanation beyond the silnple observation of their existence.
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Exphmat ion IS 11c1thcr redm:t1vc (moving toward a finite set of pri!Kiples that cover all o.:cnrreoccs ), nor progressive (a claim that more closely approximales that finite ret of principles}. Explanation is local not transcendent."
Comment: Exphmat ion
IS 11c1thcr redm:t1vc (moving toward a finite set of pri!Kiples that cover all
o.:cnrreoccs ), nor progressive (a claim that more closely approximales that finite
ret of principles}. Explanation is local not transcendent.
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "cause must be recognized, perhaps in difficult ;vays-motivate~ the profussional aclivity of inquiry. It also establishes the primacy of the analyst in the fidd Df knowledge. Layprople cannot know as the professianal can."
Comment: cause must be recognized, perhaps in difficult ;vays-motivate~ the profussional
aclivity of inquiry. It also establishes the primacy of the analyst in the fidd Df
knowledge. Layprople cannot know as the professianal can.
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Theories that are classically causal hang on Mill's principles of necessity (if no X-agent, then no ¥-consequence) and sufficiency (if X, then always Y)."
Comment: Theories that are classically causal hang on Mill's principles of necessity (if no
X-agent, then no ¥-consequence) and sufficiency (if X, then always Y).
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Most argue a wnditional relationship where the appearance of the <~gent incwaseH !he likelihood of ({lf .~cts a probability concernin~) !l1e apJXar ance of the consequent."
Comment: Most argue a wnditional relationship where the appearance of the
<~gent incwaseH !he likelihood of ({lf .~cts a probability concernin~) !l1e apJXar
ance of the consequent.
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "importance of chaos theory is that it breaks the' connection between determinism and prediction."
Comment: importance of chaos theory is that it breaks the' connection
between determinism and prediction.
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "V."ha1makes a throry deterministic is the causal chain that explains the elementof inierest."
Comment: V."ha1makes a throry deterministic is the causal chain that explains the elementof inierest.
Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Chaos theories <~:llow the analyst to ten us a fragmentary but true story ofwhat h(lppened without bcing abfe to tell us: what will happen, incompleteness and postdiction are necessary characteristics of chaotic theories. "
Comment: Chaos theories <~:llow the analyst to ten us a fragmentary but true story ofwhat h(lppened without bcing abfe to tell us: what will happen, incompleteness and postdiction are necessary characteristics of chaotic theories.
Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: " fs there a supervenient relationship between the material, the biological, and the cognitive realmsof human activity (ls each of the subsequent realms an expression of the previous one}? If so, then constructionist activities are a screen for what is actually happening. U not, lhen constructionist activities are their own proper object of inquiry."
Comment: fs there a supervenient relationship between the material, the biological, and the cognitive realmsof human activity (ls each of the subsequent realms an expression of the previous one}? If so, then constructionist activities are a screen for what is actually happening. U not, lhen constructionist activities are their own proper object of inquiry.
Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "constructionism is !he basis fur considering reality to be multiple, contingent, and subordinate"
Comment: constructionism is !he basis fur considering reality to be multiple,
contingent, and subordinate
Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Semiotic processes are considered to play an active role in reality conslmctlon in three ways: by punctuation, by semiosis, and b)• extension."
Comment: Semiotic processes are considered to play an active role in reality conslmctlon
in three ways: by punctuation, by semiosis, and b)• extension.
Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Many of the contemporary theories in communication depend on some belief in the constructed nature of reality and knowledge"
Comment: Many of the contemporary theories in communication depend on some belief
in the constructed nature of reality and knowledge
Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "presumption that reality is pr("S{'ntcd to us in a continuous llheit vuriahle stream of exchange rather tinn in discrete en!iti~s."
Comment: presumption that reality
is pr("S{'ntcd to us in a continuous llheit vuriahle stream of exchange rather tinn
in discrete en!iti~s.
Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Reality cunstmclion references acts nf human creation (and also the human engagl'mcnt of fC"J!ity"
Comment: Reality cunstmclion references acts nf human creation (and also the human
engagl'mcnt of fC"J!ity
Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "that bring into existence circumstances of the same force as self-presenting events."
Comment: that bring into
existence circumstances of the same force as self-presenting events.
Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Most constructionist punctuation claims are used in explanations of the processe.~ of perception (rn-gnitive lheories) or of the ro!cofl.mguage as a realityconstruction device (hermeneutic theoric~}. "
Comment: Most constructionist punctuation claims are used in explanations of the processe.~ of perception (rn-gnitive lheories) or of the ro!cofl.mguage as a realityconstruction device (hermeneutic theoric~}.
Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "punctua!ion stands against the claim of self-presenting"
Comment: punctua!ion stands against the claim of self-presenting
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Signiflersare, therefore, said to "float {Barthes, 1974). The action that contains them to a particular referentiality is constitutive. "
Comment: Signiflersare, therefore, said to "float {Barthes, 1974). The action that contains them to a particular referentiality is constitutive.
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "events and argues jpstead that reality is, at the very least, a composite of encoding and decoding."
Comment: events and argues jpstead that reality is, at the very least, a composite of encoding
and decoding.
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Semiosis is the method and moment in which an event is recognized l'IS meaningful. It is the moment (and the methods of attaining that moment) when a perception (a mental event with significance) enters into its potential <Is an agent of action."
Comment: Semiosis is the method and moment in which an event is recognized l'IS meaningful. It is the moment (and the methods of attaining that moment) when a perception (a mental event with significance) enters into its potential <Is an agent of action.
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Edmund Husseri's (l90i/1970) philosophy of intentional consciousness has been cited both as a cornerstone of modern hermeneutics (Mueller- Vollmer, 1990) and as the source for the science of phenomenological insight (Lanigan,"
Comment: Edmund Husseri's (l90i/1970) philosophy of intentional consciousness has
been cited both as a cornerstone of modern hermeneutics (Mueller- Vollmer,
1990) and as the source for the science of phenomenological insight (Lanigan,
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "~ 988). Fvr ~usserl, thereala~sesin the spatial, temporal relationships of the egom the matenal world. What IS real is materialized in intentional action. Genuineknowledge ensues 1101 from the external, objective ~tudy of!he materia! but from the reflexive analysis of the intentional relationship. "
Comment: ~ 988). Fvr ~usserl, thereala~sesin the spatial, temporal relationships of the egom the matenal world. What IS real is materialized in intentional action. Genuineknowledge ensues 1101 from the external, objective ~tudy of!he materia! but from the reflexive analysis of the intentional relationship.
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: " content is the factual fOundation for the production of an interpreted (or <~ctivated} text. The agency of content is not its facts, however; it is the produced text. Most ofthese explanations emanate from hermeneutic camps, although .some radical perceptual arguments make use of something similar. "
Comment: content is the factual fOundation for the production of an interpreted (or <~ctivated} text. The agency of content is not its facts, however; it is the produced text. Most ofthese explanations emanate from hermeneutic camps, although .some radical perceptual arguments make use of something similar.
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: ".transcendental phenomeoology"
Comment: .transcendental phenomeoology
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "phenomeoology by declaring a set of mbom, umversalmtenhons !hat allows a common human experience of reality and that is the true object of inquiry"
Comment: phenomeoology by declaring a set of
mbom, umversalmtenhons !hat allows a common human experience of reality
and that is the true object of inquiry
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Merleau- Pont}'"
Comment: Merleau- Pont}'
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "existentl~l (m!her .!han ~he :ranscendental} character of modern pheno· menol;'glcal analys1s. Tim ~1stential character redirects phenomenological analysis from a search for umversals to an examination of the intentionality of lived experience {Sobchack,"
Comment: existentl~l (m!her .!han ~he :ranscendental} character of modern pheno·
menol;'glcal analys1s. Tim ~1stential character redirects phenomenological
analysis from a search for umversals to an examination of the intentionality of
lived experience {Sobchack,
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The radical break across these sorts of applications of the ;::onstitutive aspects of semiosis is the availability of a true (or rightly interpreted) text As Qne moves roward the radical in hermeneutks, the objective text recedes and imerpretive difference advances. In the end, meaning becomes rhe!Drical andtexts nominated as true are so pJaced via the political rather than the veridical. "
Comment: The radical break across these sorts of applications of the ;::onstitutive aspects of semiosis is the availability of a true (or rightly interpreted) text As Qne moves roward the radical in hermeneutks, the objective text recedes and imerpretive difference advances. In the end, meaning becomes rhe!Drical andtexts nominated as true are so pJaced via the political rather than the veridical.
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "experience {Sobchack, 1992). Phenomenology seeks to explicate the consciOUS!lf'S!i of human experience. It moves from a description of the experienced, to a reduction of the expe:iendng !o its. genuine elements, to an interpretation of the experien.::er(Lamgan, 1991}. It lS constructionist in that reality is the product of the humanconsciousness working {Le., intention"lly directed toward) the material. II is not ~di~'>~ncratic, however, in that an explanatio11 must be developed for eachmdw1dual. Rather, consciousness is subjective-an identifiable stance emanating from collective rules of intentionality. We arriv..-:, then, at an understandingof the subjective consciousness of lived experience, "
Comment: experience {Sobchack, 1992).
Phenomenology seeks to explicate the consciOUS!lf'S!i of human experience. It moves from a description of the experienced, to a reduction of the expe:iendng !o its. genuine elements, to an interpretation of the experien.::er(Lamgan, 1991}. It lS constructionist in that reality is the product of the humanconsciousness working {Le., intention"lly directed toward) the material. II is not ~di~'>~ncratic, however, in that an explanatio11 must be developed for eachmdw1dual. Rather, consciousness is subjective-an identifiable stance emanating from collective rules of intentionality. We arriv..-:, then, at an understandingof the subjective consciousness of lived experience,
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "fn no case, however,is semiosis considered to be under individual control."
Comment: fn no case, however,is semiosis considered to be under individual control.
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "governed by orga!Jic per-ceptual processes, the soci.11ization processes of cognitive structure formalion, culturally proce'lS<!ll of subjectivity, or the contextualization of action."
Comment: governed by orga!Jic per-ceptual processes, the soci.11ization processes
of cognitive structure formalion, culturally proce'lS<!ll of subjectivity, or the
contextualization of action.
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Harrison"
Comment: Harrison
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "the determinacy of texlual meaning is founded on tbe principle that "these signs standing in these relationships to one another in this context, can bear these possible interpretations bw not those"'"
Comment: the determinacy of texlual meaning is founded on tbe principle
that "these signs standing in these relationships to one another in this context,
can bear these possible interpretations bw not those"'
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "~merican pragmatism"
Comment: ~merican pragmatism
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Semiotic extension refers to the proposition that !he signified (e.g., what a word might stand for) is not a material object (the word tree does. nc>t stand for a tree24} bnt is Itself another signinvoking another signified. "
Comment: Semiotic extension refers to the proposition that !he signified (e.g., what a word might stand for) is not a material object (the word tree does. nc>t stand for a tree24} bnt is Itself another signinvoking another signified.
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "beetl characterized as forming a point of resistance to Brilish em piricism on the one hand (Roth. 1993) and Cartesianism on the other (Murphy;"
Comment: beetl characterized as forming a point of resistance to Brilish em
piricism on the one hand (Roth. 1993) and Cartesianism on the other (Murphy;
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: ""'web of signifteance" appliH to all sign usage. "
Comment: "'web of signifteance" appliH to all sign usage.
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "determinism-our presen-t state is the playing out of forces initiated in the first coming together of human society. "
Comment: determinism-our presen-t state is the playing out of forces initiated in the first coming together of human society.
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Atomism give$ way to continuity, div«sitr to w1ity, discre1eness to intnrelation, isoktion to inter· actk>n. {pp.lQ-ll}"
Comment: Atomism give$ way to
continuity, div«sitr to w1ity, discre1eness to intnrelation, isoktion to inter·
actk>n. {pp.lQ-ll}
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "inquiry as a practice of discovery. It requires the declaration of our ability either to resist (de Certeau, 1984} the demands of ideology through which resistance we can prodw:e a temporary individual or collective emancipation or to restructure ideology itself (Ape!, 1980) through which restructuring we can advance social justice (Habermasian communicative action) or simply produce a new set of emancipated and subjugated subjects (Fom:aultian change)."
Comment: inquiry as a
practice of discovery. It requires the declaration of our ability either to resist (de
Certeau, 1984} the demands of ideology through which resistance we can
prodw:e a temporary individual or collective emancipation or to restructure
ideology itself (Ape!, 1980) through which restructuring we can advance social
justice (Habermasian communicative action) or simply produce a new set of
emancipated and subjugated subjects (Fom:aultian change).
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The pragmatic notion of experience is one of interpenetration, an active interrelallonship in whkh experience arises out of action in the phenomenal world."
Comment: The pragmatic notion of experience is one of interpenetration, an active
interrelallonship in whkh experience arises out of action in the phenomenal
world.
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: " humanagent cocreatinga reality with its own markings."
Comment: humanagent cocreatinga reality with its own markings.
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Pragmatism substitutes instead a method that begins with belief that is to be acted upon (and from which pragmatism establishes its name), the validation of intersubjectivity, and a line of attack that is multiple and 'aried."
Comment: Pragmatism substitutes instead a method that begins with belief that is to
be acted upon (and from which pragmatism establishes its name), the validation
of intersubjectivity, and a line of attack that is multiple and 'aried.
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Knowledgeis not a passive discovery but an acknowledged manner of acting upon the phenomenal world (foas, 1993}. As Dewey argues, there is no single reality;instead, there are as many realities as there are acceptable epistemoiogicaf linesof action. "
Comment: Knowledgeis not a passive discovery but an acknowledged manner of acting upon the phenomenal world (foas, 1993}. As Dewey argues, there is no single reality;instead, there are as many realities as there are acceptable epistemoiogicaf linesof action.
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "A long-standing debate ln philosophy focuses on the relative prior status ofessence and existence."
Comment: A long-standing debate ln philosophy focuses on the relative prior status ofessence and existence.
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: " Determinism establishes essence as prior to existence: We are born into n world in which the future is already encoded in forces already in act inn. [n deterministic formulation..<;. essence determines existence. Constructionism adjusts this relationship by arguing that existence must be directly taken into account in any understanding of present reality."
Comment: Determinism establishes essence as prior to existence: We are born into n world in which the future is already encoded in forces already in act inn. [n deterministic formulation..<;. essence determines existence. Constructionism adjusts this relationship by arguing that existence must be directly taken into account in any understanding of present reality.
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "individualism is expressly denied)."
Comment: individualism is expressly
denied).
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Knowledge is public accomplishment based on joint agreement not private inspiration."
Comment: Knowledge is
public accomplishment based on joint agreement not private inspiration.
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "In constructionist formulations, existence at least mo_difies essence."
Comment: In constructionist formulations, existence at least
mo_difies essence.
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Actional constructionism takes us fur1her down the existentialist road, seei11g_ reality as the product of cultural agents acting in the world.26 Themeaning of all things is materialized in action. And action is nlwflys a local improvisation that is partia!ry representative of all pnssible improvisatio-ns."
Comment: Actional constructionism takes us fur1her down the existentialist road, seei11g_ reality as the product of cultural agents acting in the world.26 Themeaning of all things is materialized in action. And action is nlwflys a local improvisation that is partia!ry representative of all pnssible improvisatio-ns.
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Cultural constrttt:tionism works from the ll~<aJmptlon that one is hom into anongoing system of understanding that is cosmological i11 its effect, reat·hing intoevery aspect oflife. "
Comment: Cultural constrttt:tionism works from the ll~<aJmptlon that one is hom into anongoing system of understanding that is cosmological i11 its effect, reat·hing intoevery aspect oflife.
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Reality is always historkil:ed (instantiated), exce85iVe (beyond an effective prediction and control), and :obundm1t {in production_)."
Comment: Reality is always historkil:ed (instantiated), exce85iVe (beyond an
effective prediction and control), and :obundm1t {in production_).
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "In strict structuralist formulas. ideology is no different from "big bangw"
Comment: In strict structuralist formulas. ideology is no different from "big bangw
Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Action is a creative perfurmance materializing institionaJized understandings. "
Comment: Action is a creative perfurmance materializing institionaJized understandings.
Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "constructionism rdativizes knowl edge. It releases knowledge from any rock-bottom foundation of objective phenomena or unirusal experience and recognizesit a.s-asetofinsti tutionalized agreements."
Comment: constructionism rdativizes knowl
edge. It releases knowledge from any rock-bottom foundation of objective
phenomena or unirusal experience and recognizesit a.s-asetofinsti tutionalized
agreements.
Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Hermeneutic theories hold that reality is some composite of the material and the conscious and that human actiGn is both productive of and directed by that composition,"
Comment: Hermeneutic theories hold that reality is some composite of the material
and the conscious and that human actiGn is both productive of and directed by
that composition,
Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Knowledge is, therefore, always subjective (from a locatable-not a personal-position); there are no Archimedean points (not even this one) from which to move the universe."
Comment: Knowledge is, therefore, always subjective (from a
locatable-not a personal-position); there are no Archimedean points (not
even this one) from which to move the universe.
Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "By propos ing a semiotklconscioustmental domain whose fmmdation is romehow a hu man adllevemenl (whether by material practkes-strocturation, existentialist tbemies, reception criticism-or by inborn rharacteristks-Kant ian logic, phe nomenologicnl interpretation, Choms:kian linguistics, structuralist criticism), theorists craft new epistemological s1andards. for inquiry."
Comment: By propos
ing a semiotklconscioustmental domain whose fmmdation is romehow a hu
man adllevemenl (whether by material practkes-strocturation, existentialist
tbemies, reception criticism-or by inborn rharacteristks-Kant ian logic, phe
nomenologicnl interpretation, Choms:kian linguistics, structuralist criticism),
theorists craft new epistemological s1andards. for inquiry.
Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "h£>W do I manage the sureties of my life given the uncertainty of my knowledge)"
Comment: h£>W
do I manage the sureties of my life given the uncertainty of my knowledge)
Page 17, Highlight (Custom Color: #bf96ff):
Content: "material practkes-strocturation, existentialist tbemies, reception criticism-or by inborn rharacteristks-Kant ian logic, phe nomenologicnl interpretation, Choms:kian linguistics, structuralist criticism),"
Comment: material practkes-strocturation, existentialist
tbemies, reception criticism-or by inborn rharacteristks-Kant ian logic, phe
nomenologicnl interpretation, Choms:kian linguistics, structuralist criticism),
Page 17, Highlight (Custom Color: #ad88ff):
Content: " this diapter lws beenabout: What is the reaU And what is my koowledge of it? "
Comment: this diapter lws beenabout: What is the reaU And what is my koowledge of it?
Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Those standards may or may not break with the determinism that commonly appears with materialism. The break with determinism requires acceptance of original creative events-event! that are their own explanation (eventssometimes derided as miracles, as in the Harris cartoon). Theories that offerunexplainable initial eonditions or acts of agency are nondetermioisticalthoughthey may be causal within the consequences of chance and clmice. (semiotic, phen() menologicaL pragmatic, cultural/critical, and actional}. These five faUatongthe essence-to-existence dimension with semiotic and phenomenolngicnl bcing expressed primarily on the essence-is-prior-to-action ;;ide and the pragmatic and ru:-lion<'l moving 1owatd the existence-pmvicle~-C'Ssena end."
Comment: Those standards may or may not break with the determinism that commonly appears with materialism. The break with determinism requires acceptance of original creative events-event! that are their own explanation (eventssometimes derided as miracles, as in the Harris cartoon). Theories that offerunexplainable initial eonditions or acts of agency are nondetermioisticalthoughthey may be causal within the consequences of chance and clmice.
(semiotic, phen()
menologicaL pragmatic, cultural/critical, and actional}. These five faUatongthe
essence-to-existence dimension with semiotic and phenomenolngicnl bcing
expressed primarily on the essence-is-prior-to-action ;;ide and the pragmatic
and ru:-lion<'l moving 1owatd the existence-pmvicle~-C'Ssena end.
Page 17, Highlight (Custom Color: #bf96ff):
Content: "t five of these conslructionist positions (semiotic, phen()menologicaL pragmatic, cultural/critical, and actional}. "
Comment: t five of these conslructionist positions (semiotic, phen()menologicaL pragmatic, cultural/critical, and actional}.
Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "In this chapter we have been looking at fuur issues: What is the real? What are thedomairnof reality! What is the structure of the reality domain(s}? And what are the soun:es of that structure?"
Comment: In this chapter we have been looking at fuur issues: What is the real? What are
thedomairnof reality! What is the structure of the reality domain(s}? And what
are the soun:es of that structure?
Page 17, Highlight (Custom Color: #bf96ff):
Content: "Vfe now have four tools by which 10 evaluate theories. Whal is !·he explana !nr}' objec! aml how i;; it held to be real~ In wh<1t son of domain does that ol~t exist? Vhat is the structural character of that domain? Does cret~tion or agency appear •.vi thin it,am:iif so,huwdDesit function~"
Comment: Vfe now have four tools by which 10 evaluate theories. Whal is !·he explana
!nr}' objec! aml how i;; it held to be real~ In wh<1t son of domain does that ol~t
exist? Vhat is the structural character of that domain? Does cret~tion or agency
appear •.vi thin it,am:iif so,huwdDesit function~
Page 18, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: " These interrogations can be applied to any sort of theory: aesthetic,critical,ethical, literary, scientific. They all must hold something to be real in some wayw:ith some explanatory value which itself must obliterate or manage creation. "
Comment: These interrogations can be applied to any sort of theory: aesthetic,critical,ethical, literary, scientific. They all must hold something to be real in some wayw:ith some explanatory value which itself must obliterate or manage creation.
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Diana Ascher