Annotation Summary for: Goldman 62144381-Knowledge-in-a-Social-World
Page 1, Note (Yellow):
Read pp. 3-40
Page 5, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "One Epistemology and Postmodern Resistance Alvin I. Goldman 1.1 Truth Seeking in the Social World said Aristotle “ALL men by nature desire to know.” Our interest in information has two sources: curiosity and practical concerns. What we seek in all such cases is true or accurate information,not misinformation. Question asking is a universal feature of human communication and the prototype of a truth-seeking practice. "
Comment: One Epistemology and Postmodern Resistance
Alvin I. Goldman
1.1 Truth Seeking in the Social World
said Aristotle
“ALL men by nature desire to know.”
Our interest in information has two
sources: curiosity and practical concerns.
What we seek in all such cases is true or accurate information,not misinformation.
Question asking is a universal feature of human communication and the prototype of a truth-seeking practice.
Page 5, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The truth motive explains why questioners direct their interrogatories at authoritative informants. "
Comment: The truth motive explains why questioners direct their interrogatories at authoritative informants.
Page 5, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Although question asking is interpersonal, truth seeking is not universally or necessarily social."
Comment: Although question asking is interpersonal, truth seeking is not universally or necessarily
social.
Page 5, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "An enormous portion of our truthseeking, however, is either directly or indirectly social. "
Comment: An enormous portion of our truthseeking, however, is either directly or indirectly social.
Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Traditional epistemology, especially in the Cartesian tradition, was highly individualistic, what I have called individual epistemology. given the deeply collaborative and interactive nature of knowledge seeking, especially in the modern world, individual epistemology needs a social counterpart: social epistemology. focuses on social paths or routes to knowledge. social epistemology does not restrict itself to believers taken singly. society—and examines the spread of information or misinformation across that group's membership. it addressesthe distribution of knowledge or error within the larger social cluster. social epistemology may consider collective or corporate entities, such as juries or legislatures, as potential knowing agents."
Comment: Traditional epistemology, especially in the Cartesian tradition, was highly individualistic,
what I have called individual epistemology.
given the deeply collaborative and interactive nature of knowledge seeking,
especially in the modern world, individual epistemology needs a social counterpart:
social epistemology.
focuses on social paths or routes
to knowledge.
social epistemology does not
restrict itself to believers taken singly.
society—and
examines the spread of information or misinformation across that group's membership.
it addressesthe distribution of knowledge or error within the larger social cluster.
social epistemology may consider collective or corporate entities, such as juries or legislatures,
as potential knowing agents.
Page 6, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "social epistemology, veritistic dimension, it is concerned with both knowledge and its contraries: error (false belief) andignorance (the absence of true belief true belief.3 main question Which practices have a comparatively favorable impact on knowledge as contrasted with error and ignorance?"
Comment: social epistemology,
veritistic dimension,
it is concerned with both knowledge and its contraries: error (false belief) andignorance (the absence of true belief
true belief.3
main question
Which practices have a comparatively favorable impact on knowledge as contrasted with
error and ignorance?
Page 7, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Social veritistic epistemology"
Comment: Social veritistic epistemology
Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "has the distinctive normative purpose of evaluating or appraising such practices on the veritistic dimension, that is, in terms of their respective knowledge consequences"
Comment: has the distinctive normative purpose of evaluating or
appraising such practices on the veritistic dimension, that is, in terms of their respective knowledge consequences
Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "veritistic epistemology tackles the admittedly nontrivial task of assessing both actual and possible practices in terms of their foreseeable informational bounty."
Comment: veritistic epistemology tackles the
admittedly nontrivial task of assessing both actual and possible practices in terms of their
foreseeable informational bounty.
Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "the idea that the study of social “knowledge” should be confined to the interpersonal and cultural determination of belief: not true or false belief, just plain belief."
Comment: the idea that the study of social “knowledge” should
be confined to the interpersonal and cultural determination of belief: not true or false
belief, just plain belief.
Page 8, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "epistemology meaning knowledge, doxology, meaning opinion or belief"
Comment: epistemology
meaning knowledge,
doxology,
meaning opinion or belief
Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "truth is defined, for Shapin's purposes, asaccepted belief."
Comment: truth is defined, for Shapin's purposes, asaccepted belief.
Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Unless true opinion is distinguished from opinion per se, we cannot draw the palpable distinction between normal, truth-seeking questioners, and survey researchers who merely want respondents' opinions.7"
Comment: Unless true opinion is distinguished from opinion per se, we cannot draw the palpable
distinction between normal, truth-seeking questioners, and survey researchers who
merely want respondents' opinions.7
Page 9, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The distinction between truth and belief can be illustrated by the concept of a valid argument."
Comment: The distinction between truth and belief can be illustrated by the concept of a valid
argument.
Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "balidity"
Comment: balidity
Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "if we substituted “belief” for “truth” everywhere, we would be forced to abandon the standard distinction between valid and invalid arguments, and make do with a different distinction between balid and inbalid arguments."
Comment: if we substituted “belief”
for “truth” everywhere, we would be forced to abandon the standard distinction between
valid and invalid arguments, and make do with a different distinction between balid and
inbalid arguments.
Page 10, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "1.3 Six Criticisms of Truth-Based Epistemology"
Comment: 1.3 Six Criticisms of Truth-Based Epistemology
Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "1.4 The Argument from Social Construction"
Comment: 1.4 The Argument from Social Construction
Page 11, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "(1) There is no such thing as transcendent truth. What we call “true” is simply what we agree with. So-called truths or facts are merely negotiated beliefs, the products of social construction and fabrication, not ‘objective’ or ‘external’ features of the world."
Comment: (1) There is no such thing as transcendent truth. What we call “true” is simply what we
agree with. So-called truths or facts are merely negotiated beliefs, the products of
social construction and fabrication, not ‘objective’ or ‘external’ features of the world.
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Performative theorists are right, of course, to the extent that someone who believes a statement to be true is prepared to agree with others who might assert it. This does not imply, however, that all one does in calling a statement “true” is signal a willingness to agree with others."
Comment: Performative theorists are right, of
course, to the extent that someone who believes a statement to be true is prepared to
agree with others who might assert it. This does not imply, however, that all one does in
calling a statement “true” is signal a willingness to agree with others.
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Hilary Putnam (1978: 108–9) observes, if “true” simply meant “stably believed,” it would be pointless to say, “I grant that P is stably believed, but is it true?” Since such a question always does have a point, truth cannot be equated with stabilized or institutionalized belief."
Comment: Hilary Putnam (1978: 108–9) observes, if “true” simply meant “stably
believed,” it would be pointless to say, “I grant that P is stably believed, but is it true?”
Since such a question always does have a point, truth cannot be equated with stabilized or
institutionalized belief.
Page 12, Line Drawing (Red)
Page 12, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Peer acceptance of one's statements might make one happy, but it does not make those statements more or less true.9 Not only does the truth of a proposition not require total consensus, it does not require anybody at all to believe it."
Comment: Peer acceptance of one's statements might make
one happy, but it does not make those statements more or less true.9
Not only does the truth of a proposition not require total consensus, it
does not require anybody at all to believe it.
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The conviction that convergence coincides with truth is the faith of optimists, not part of a proper definition of truth."
Comment: The
conviction that convergence coincides with truth is the faith of optimists, not part of a
proper definition of truth.
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: " social constructivists might concede that ordinary thought admits the possibility of truth without consensus, but why should ordinary thought go uncontested?"
Comment: social constructivists
might concede that ordinary thought admits the possibility of truth without
consensus, but why should ordinary thought go uncontested?
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Latour and Woolgar All that really exists are sets of beliefs or inscriptions that scientific actors distribute within a social network."
Comment: Latour and Woolgar
All that really exists are sets of beliefs or inscriptions that
scientific actors distribute within a social network.
Page 13, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "They explicitly affirm that facts (or truths) are “constituted” or “fabricated” when statements come to be accepted, or no longer contested."
Comment: They explicitly affirm
that facts (or truths) are “constituted” or “fabricated” when statements come to be
accepted, or no longer contested.
Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Latour and Woolgar deny the existence of “out there” truths or facts. The language of “truth” or “fact” is only legitimately applicable to accepted statements of the community of scientists, that is, to consensual beliefs."
Comment: Latour and Woolgar deny the existence of “out there” truths or facts. The
language of “truth” or “fact” is only legitimately applicable to accepted statements of the community of scientists, that is, to consensual beliefs.
Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "facts refuse to become sociologized. "
Comment: facts refuse to become sociologized.
Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "their conclusion, that there are no external (scientific) facts, is what philosophers call a negative existential statement."
Comment: their conclusion, that there are no external (scientific) facts, is what
philosophers call a negative existential statement.
Page 14, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "witches. Latour and Woolgar may be arguing that the “observable” phenomena they study, namely, agreement and disagreement among scientists, can be fully and satisfactorily explained by social acts of argumentation and negotiation (triggered, perhaps, by outputs of experimental apparatus). “External” scientific entities like"
Comment: witches. Latour and Woolgar may be arguing that the “observable” phenomena they
study, namely, agreement and disagreement among scientists, can be fully and
satisfactorily explained by social acts of argumentation and negotiation (triggered,
perhaps, by outputs of experimental apparatus). “External” scientific entities like
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "hormones or chemical structures are not needed for a satisfactory explanation, so we should deny their existence."
Comment: hormones or chemical structures are not needed for a satisfactory explanation, so we
should deny their existence.
Page 15, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Can sociological analysis alone provide a satisfactory explanation of scientific agreement and disagreement?"
Comment: Can sociological analysis alone provide a satisfactory explanation of scientific agreement
and disagreement?
Page 15, Line Drawing (Red)
Page 15, Note (Yellow):
This reminds me of the wikipedia article about authorty and verifiability. Ommissions are the greatest concern
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "By acknowledging the existence of the unobservable entities, C, we provide a better,more complete, explanation of the events in question “out there” entities expanded causal explanations,"
Comment: By acknowledging the existence of the unobservable entities, C, we provide a better,more complete, explanation of the events in question
“out there” entities
expanded causal explanations,
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The mere fact that negotiatory acts play a role in the formation of scientific belief does not preclude the possibility of a more complete explanation, and such an explanation might ultimately invoke “external,” “out there” entities of the sort Latour and Woolgar dislike."
Comment: The mere fact that negotiatory acts play a role in the formation of scientific belief does
not preclude the possibility of a more complete explanation, and such an explanation
might ultimately invoke “external,” “out there” entities of the sort Latour and Woolgar
dislike.
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "unwarranted in saying that scientists “fabricate” such entities when they hypothesize them. Consensual belief in such entities may indeed be produced by human interaction. But the entities themselves, if they really exist, are not produced by human interaction."
Comment: unwarranted in saying that scientists
“fabricate” such entities when they hypothesize them. Consensual belief in such entities
may indeed be produced by human interaction. But the entities themselves, if they really
exist, are not produced by human interaction.
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "they have failed to establish the negative existential statement."
Comment: they have failed to establish the negative
existential statement.
Page 16, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "According to constructivism, the truth of a statement P consists in there being a consensual belief in P by a community."
Comment: According to constructivism, the truth of
a statement P consists in there being a consensual belief in P by a community.
Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "an infinite regress is generated."
Comment: an infinite regress is generated.
Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Social constructivists,"
Comment: Social constructivists,
Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "have not really reflected systematically on these ontological questions.11"
Comment: have not really reflected systematically on
these ontological questions.11
Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "1.5 Language and Worldmaking Truth is said to be an “effect of discourse” This obsession with language as the determiner of knowledge and reality leads to the second line of criticism of veritistic epistemology,"
Comment: 1.5 Language and Worldmaking
Truth is said to be an “effect
of discourse”
This obsession with language as the determiner of knowledge and reality leads to the
second line of criticism of veritistic epistemology,
Page 17, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "(2) Knowledge, reality, and truth are the products of language. There is no language- independent reality that can make our thoughts true or false."
Comment: (2) Knowledge, reality, and truth are the products of language. There is no language-
independent reality that can make our thoughts true or false.
Page 18, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The first point to notice is that postmodernists tend to conflate knowledge, reality, and truth. These must be kept distinct."
Comment: The first point to notice is that postmodernists tend to conflate knowledge, reality, and
truth. These must be kept distinct.
Page 18, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The thesis of linguistic determinism antedates postmodernism, starting as early as the famous Sapir–Whorf hypothesis (Sapir 1921) that people's thoughts are determined by the categories made available in their language. color “preferences” stemming from what we see shape the color vocabularies of languages. the ability to think or represent color categories is not exhausted by prior linguistic vocabulary,"
Comment: The thesis of linguistic determinism antedates postmodernism, starting as early as the
famous Sapir–Whorf hypothesis (Sapir 1921) that people's thoughts are determined by
the categories made available in their language.
color
“preferences” stemming from what we see shape the color vocabularies of languages.
the ability to think or represent color categories is not exhausted by prior linguistic
vocabulary,
Page 18, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "a language-independent preference for the former shade, presumably based on a nonlexicalized perceptual experience."
Comment: a language-independent preference for the former shade, presumably based on a nonlexicalized perceptual experience.
Page 19, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Thought must ontogenetically precede language."
Comment: Thought must ontogenetically precede language.
Page 19, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: ". If there can be two thoughts corresponding toone word, however, thoughts can't be words. In short, postmodernists need to moderate their claim that language is the great determiner of thought, for that unqualified view is simply false. "
Comment: . If there can be two thoughts corresponding toone word, however, thoughts can't be words. In short, postmodernists need to moderate
their claim that language is the great determiner of thought, for that unqualified view is
simply false.
Page 19, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "shall not waste space defending the reality of the external world, since I am unpersuaded that postmodernists sincerely deny it."
Comment: shall not waste space defending the reality of
the external world, since I am unpersuaded that postmodernists sincerely deny it.
Page 19, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Goodman says that people make reality, or “make worlds,” by drawing certain boundaries rather than others."
Comment: Goodman says that people make reality, or “make worlds,” by drawing certain
boundaries rather than others.
Page 20, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "No boundaries can be drawn unless there is a pre-existing territory on which to draw them."
Comment: No boundaries can
be drawn unless there is a pre-existing territory on which to draw them.
Page 20, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Searle points out, is that people do not so much fix the world (or reality) as they fix the categories for classifying the world."
Comment: Searle points out, is that people do not so much fix
the world (or reality) as they fix the categories for classifying the world.
Page 20, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Conceptual relativism, properly understood, is an account of how we fix the applications of our terms."
Comment: Conceptual relativism, properly understood, is an account of how we fix the applications
of our terms.
Page 20, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "once we have fixed the meaning of such terms in our vocabulary by arbitrary definitions, it is no longer a matter of any kind of relativism or arbitrariness whether representation-independent features of the world satisfy those definitions, because the features of the world that satisfy or fail to satisfy the definitions exist independently of those or any other definitions ."
Comment: once we have fixed
the meaning of such terms in our vocabulary by arbitrary definitions, it is no longer a
matter of any kind of relativism or arbitrariness whether representation-independent
features of the world satisfy those definitions, because the features of the world that
satisfy or fail to satisfy the definitions exist independently of those or any other
definitions .
Page 20, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "we make descriptions that the actual world may fit or fail to fit."
Comment: we make descriptions
that the actual world may fit or fail to fit.
Page 20, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Neither people nor their language literally create truths."
Comment: Neither people nor their language literally create truths.
Page 20, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "They merely create candidates for truth value, which features of the world render true or false."
Comment: They merely create candidates for truth value,
which features of the world render true or false.
Page 20, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Occasionally, linguistic acts make their own contents true, as when telling someone she will win her tennis match so bolsters her confidence that she does win. Even in such cases, however, the linguistic actdoes not directly confer truth on its content. It is still the portion of the world predicted that directly confers truth or falsity on the prediction's propositional content. "
Comment: Occasionally, linguistic acts
make their own contents true, as when telling someone she will win her tennis match so
bolsters her confidence that she does win. Even in such cases, however, the linguistic actdoes not directly confer truth on its content. It is still the portion of the world predicted
that directly confers truth or falsity on the prediction's propositional content.
Page 21, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: " only the world confers truth and falsity. The thought contents we consider and accept are rarely “given” to us by the (nonhuman) world. They result from our own biological resources and linguistic activities; in that sense, they are human constructs or products."
Comment: only the world confers truth and falsity.
The thought contents we consider and accept
are rarely “given” to us by the (nonhuman) world. They result from our own biological
resources and linguistic activities; in that sense, they are human constructs or products.
Page 21, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "knowledge is (partly) a social construct. But since knowledge istrue belief, knowledge also involves truth; and what is true, as we have seen, is not a human construct as opposed to being of the world"
Comment: knowledge is (partly) a social construct. But since knowledge istrue belief, knowledge also involves truth; and what is true, as we have seen, is not a
human construct as opposed to being of the world
Page 21, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "knowledge is always “local,” “contextual,” or “situated” rather than timeless or universal. Knowledge partly consists of belief, and belief is always local or situated because it is always the belief of a particular knower or group of knowers who live at particular points in time. But knowledge also partly consists of truth, and when a fully determinate proposition is true, it is true for all time, not just at particular times or places"
Comment: knowledge is always “local,” “contextual,” or “situated” rather than timeless
or universal. Knowledge partly consists of belief, and belief is always local or situated
because it is always the belief of a particular knower or group of knowers who live at
particular points in time. But knowledge also partly consists of truth, and when a fully
determinate proposition is true, it is true for all time, not just at particular times or places
Page 21, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "people are often unaware of the fact that their concepts are socially constructed. it is worldly facts that confer truth,"
Comment: people are often unaware of the fact that their concepts are socially constructed.
it is worldly facts that confer truth,
Page 21, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "1.6 The Unknowability Criticism"
Comment: 1.6 The Unknowability Criticism
Page 22, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "(3) If there were any transcendent or objective truths, they would be inaccessible and unknowable by human beings, hence unavailable for any practical epistemological purposes."
Comment: (3) If there were any transcendent or objective truths, they would be inaccessible and
unknowable by human beings, hence unavailable for any practical epistemological
purposes.
Page 22, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "two possible definitions, of “transcendence,” one yielding a concept of radical transcendence and the second a concept of moderate transcendence. Radical transcendence: A state of affairs is radically transcendent just in case it is utterly and in principle unknowable by human beings. Moderate transcendence: A state of affairs is moderately transcendent just in case its obtaining is logically independent of anybody's believing that it obtains. It could obtain even if nobody believed it did, and somebody could believe it obtained without that belief (logically) guaranteeing that it did."
Comment: two possible
definitions, of “transcendence,” one
yielding a concept of radical transcendence and the second a concept of moderate
transcendence.
Radical transcendence: A state of affairs is radically transcendent just in case it is utterly
and in principle unknowable by human beings.
Moderate transcendence: A state of affairs is moderately transcendent just in case its
obtaining is logically independent of anybody's believing that it obtains. It could obtain
even if nobody believed it did, and somebody could believe it obtained without that
belief (logically) guaranteeing that it did.
Page 22, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Simply because a state of affairs is objective or external to the mind does not imply that it is utterly and in principle unknowable."
Comment: Simply because a state of affairs is objective or external to the
mind does not imply that it is utterly and in principle unknowable.
Page 22, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "most states of affairs are moderately transcendent."
Comment: most states of affairs are moderately transcendent.
Page 23, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "two main senses of “knowledge”: strong knowledge and weak knowledge (S-knowledge and W-knowledge). “superstrong” knowledge (SS-knowledge). does your evidence exclude all rival possibilities? most philosophers agree that SS-knowledge is largely unattainable. It does not follow, however, that regular old S-knowledge is unattainable."
Comment: two main senses of “knowledge”: strong knowledge and weak
knowledge (S-knowledge and W-knowledge).
“superstrong” knowledge (SS-knowledge).
does your evidence exclude all rival possibilities?
most philosophers agree that SS-knowledge is largely unattainable.
It does not follow, however, that regular old S-knowledge is unattainable.
Page 23, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Perhaps knowledge requires that only a narrower range possibilities be excluded, it is widely accepted that S-knowledge is feasible for external, or moderately transcendent, states of affairs. W-knowledge, which is simply true belief."
Comment: Perhaps knowledge requires that only a narrower range
possibilities be excluded,
it is widely accepted that S-knowledge is feasible for
external, or moderately transcendent, states of affairs.
W-knowledge, which is simply true belief.
Page 24, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "people's dominant epistemic goal, I think, is to obtain true belief, plain and simple."
Comment: people's dominant
epistemic goal, I think, is to obtain true belief, plain and simple.
Page 24, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "people's dominant epistemic goal, I think, is to obtain true belief, plain and simple. They want to be informed (have true belief) rather than misinformed or uninformed."
Comment: people's dominant
epistemic goal, I think, is to obtain true belief, plain and simple. They want to be
informed (have true belief) rather than misinformed or uninformed.
Page 24, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "ordinary sense of “know” that corresponds to true belief, The issue of justification or evidence is irrelevant. If we wonder whether Jane knows that P, again given its truth, the only issue to be settled is whether she believes it. She knows if she does believe it, and is ignorant (does not know) if she does not believe it."
Comment: ordinary sense of “know” that corresponds to true belief,
The issue of justification or evidence is irrelevant.
If we wonder whether Jane knows that P, again given its
truth, the only issue to be settled is whether she believes it. She knows if she
does believe it, and is ignorant (does not know) if she does not believe it.
Page 24, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "there is an ordinary sense of “know” in which it means “truly believe.”"
Comment: there is an ordinary sense of “know” in which it means “truly
believe.”
Page 24, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "What is required for W- knowledge, after all, is that a person actually believes that a certain state of affairs obtains and it does obtain (it is true that it obtains). some states of affairs to which it is difficult for most people to gain epistemic “access.” externality per se is not an insurmountable barrier to W- knowledge."
Comment: What is required for W-
knowledge, after all, is that a person actually believes that a certain state of affairs obtains
and it does obtain (it is true that it obtains).
some states of affairs to which it is difficult for most people to gain epistemic
“access.”
externality per se is not an insurmountable barrier to W-
knowledge.
Page 24, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "the sweeping claim of criticism (3), that"
Comment: the sweeping claim of criticism (3), that
Page 25, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "transcendent truths are unknowable for human beings, hardly applies to W-knowledge and moderately transcendent truths. “grand narratives,” metanarratives, or master narratives, which offer large-scale generalizations about history, culture, and social life some categories of thought or discourse do not admit of genuine truth or falsity at all."
Comment: transcendent truths are unknowable for human beings, hardly applies to W-knowledge
and moderately transcendent truths.
“grand narratives,” metanarratives, or master narratives, which offer large-scale
generalizations about history, culture, and social life
some categories of thought or discourse do not admit of genuine truth or falsity at all.
Page 25, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "It suffices for purposes of this book that many domains of human thought do admit of truthor falsity. If there are exceptions to this rule, that does not stop epistemology dead in its tracks. "
Comment: It suffices for purposes of this book that many domains of human thought do admit of truthor falsity. If there are exceptions to this rule, that does not stop epistemology dead in its
tracks.
Page 25, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "1.7 The Denial of Epistemic Privilege"
Comment: 1.7 The Denial of Epistemic Privilege
Page 25, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) which attacks the notion that some propositions, beliefs, or epistemic positions are more privileged than others. by attacking the very notion of a privileged representation."
Comment: Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979)
which attacks the notion that some propositions, beliefs, or
epistemic positions are more privileged than others.
by attacking the very
notion of a privileged representation.
Page 25, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "(4) There are no privileged epistemic positions, and no certain foundations for beliefs. All claims are judged by conventions or language games, which have no deeper grounding. There are no neutral, transcultural standards for settling disagreements."
Comment: (4) There are no privileged epistemic positions, and no certain foundations for beliefs. All
claims are judged by conventions or language games,
which have no deeper grounding. There are no neutral, transcultural standards for settling
disagreements.
Page 26, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "What Rorty attacks is the classical doctrine of infallibilist foundationalism, which is a doctrine about epistemic justification or warrant for a belief.18"
Comment: What Rorty attacks is the classical doctrine of infallibilist foundationalism, which is a
doctrine about epistemic justification or warrant for a belief.18
Page 26, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Originally developed by Descartes, this doctrine held that all warranted belief rests on infallible foundations, a special class of beliefs that are absolutely certain and cannot be mistaken."
Comment: Originally developed by
Descartes, this doctrine held that all warranted belief rests on infallible foundations, a
special class of beliefs that are absolutely certain and cannot be mistaken.
Page 26, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "(1953), most epistemologists have given up infallibilist foundationalism."
Comment: (1953), most epistemologists have given up
infallibilist foundationalism.
Page 26, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "alternative theories of justification, three leading candidates fallibilist foundationalism. This view agrees with traditional foundationalism in claiming that some beliefs (the foundational ones) obtain initial warrant on their own, not from other beliefs. According to fallible foundationalism, foundational beliefs are neither infallible nor certain. coherentism, which denies that there are any special foundational beliefs with independent justification. Instead, according to coherentism, all justified beliefs obtain their justification by virtue of cohering, or meshing, with the rest of the agent's belief system."
Comment: alternative theories of justification,
three leading candidates
fallibilist foundationalism. This view agrees with traditional
foundationalism in claiming that some beliefs (the foundational ones) obtain initial
warrant on their own, not from other beliefs.
According to fallible foundationalism, foundational beliefs
are neither infallible nor certain.
coherentism, which denies
that there are any special foundational beliefs with independent justification. Instead,
according to coherentism, all justified beliefs obtain their justification by virtue of
cohering, or meshing, with the rest of the agent's belief system.
Page 26, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Rorty's somehow classifies holism as an anti-epistemology doctrine, rather than a theory of justification.19"
Comment: Rorty's
somehow classifies holism as an
anti-epistemology doctrine, rather than a theory of justification.19
Page 26, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "A third theory of justification is reliabilism, In its simplest form, reliabilism says that a belief is justified in case it is produced by reliable psychological processes, where “reliable” means “produces mostly truths.”"
Comment: A third theory of
justification is reliabilism,
In its simplest form, reliabilism says that a belief is
justified in case it is produced by reliable psychological processes, where “reliable”
means “produces mostly truths.”
Page 26, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Like fallible foundationalism and coherentism, reliabilism requires neither infallibility nor certainty."
Comment: Like fallible foundationalism and coherentism,
reliabilism requires neither infallibility nor certainty.
Page 26, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The postmodern rejection of epistemic privilege is not wholly rooted in displeasure with Cartesian epistemology. Much of it has a political cast. The theory of justification is concerned with the circumstances in which a person has sufficient evidence or epistemic access to a state of affairs to be entitled to hold a certain "
Comment: The postmodern rejection of epistemic privilege is not wholly rooted in displeasure with
Cartesian epistemology. Much of it has a political cast.
The theory of justification is concerned with the circumstances in which a person has
sufficient evidence or epistemic access to a state of affairs to be entitled to hold a certain
Page 27, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "belief about it. Manifestly, epistemic access to a given state of affairs is not the same for all people and all times. It can vary from time to time and from person to person, as a function of perceptual, memorial, and inferential circumstances."
Comment: belief about it. Manifestly, epistemic access to a given state of affairs is not the same for all people and all times. It can vary from time to time and from person to person, as a
function of perceptual, memorial, and inferential circumstances.
Page 27, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "contemporary antijustificationism can be traced to Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's influence filters through the idea that justification ismerely a matter of convention, which has no rational grounding. Intellectual authorization is a matter of language games, and the choice of language games is simply a matter of local custom. "
Comment: contemporary antijustificationism can be traced to
Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's influence filters through the idea that justification ismerely a matter of convention, which has no rational grounding. Intellectual
authorization is a matter of language games, and the choice of language games is simply a matter of local custom.
Page 27, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "“All claims are judged by conventions or language games, which have no deeper grounding.” This thesis about justification is pretty dubious. Careful reflection on judgments of justification suggests—as reliabilism maintains—that a belief is considered justified if it is arrived at by processes or practices that the speaker (or the community) regards as truthconducive"
Comment: “All claims are judged by conventions or language games, which have no deeper
grounding.”
This thesis about justification is pretty dubious. Careful reflection on judgments of
justification suggests—as reliabilism maintains—that a belief is considered justified if it
is arrived at by processes or practices that the speaker (or the community) regards as truthconducive
Page 28, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "judgments of justification are grounded precisely on appeals to truth conduciveness. Given people's interest in truth, it is relevant to classify beliefs in terms of whether they were formed by truth-conducive processes or non-truth-conducive processes."
Comment: judgments of justification
are grounded precisely on appeals to truth conduciveness.
Given people's interest in truth, it is relevant to classify beliefs in terms of
whether they were formed by truth-conducive processes or non-truth-conducive
processes.
Page 28, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Many contemporary writers tend to confuse justification with interpersonal agreement. An ability to elicit agreement is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of justification."
Comment: Many contemporary writers tend to confuse justification with interpersonal agreement.
An ability to elicit agreement is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of justification.
Page 28, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Postmodernists not only think that agreement is necessary for justification, or at least rationality; they also think that the prospects for agreement are dim, because there are no transcultural principles for settling disagreements among different communities."
Comment: Postmodernists not only think that agreement is necessary for justification, or at least
rationality; they also think that the prospects for agreement are dim, because there are no
transcultural principles for settling disagreements among different communities.
Page 28, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Kuhn 1977) has insisted that there are common criteria in science, even transparadigm criteria. There he presents five characteristics—accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, andfruitfulness—which provide the “shared basis for theory choice” "
Comment: Kuhn 1977)
has insisted that there are common criteria in science, even transparadigm criteria. There
he presents five characteristics—accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, andfruitfulness—which provide the “shared basis for theory choice”
Page 28, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Other writers, however, such as Barry Barnes and David Bloor, unequivocally maintain that “there are no context- free or super-cultural norms of rationality”"
Comment: Other writers, however,
such as Barry Barnes and David Bloor, unequivocally maintain that “there are no context-
free or super-cultural norms of rationality”
Page 29, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: ", let us distinguish (1) the ultimate aim of epistemic practices from (2) the specific methods adopted in pursuit of that aim. "
Comment: , let us distinguish (1) the ultimate aim of epistemic practices from (2) the specific methods adopted in pursuit of that aim.
Page 29, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "different methods are adopted by different communities; that The unifying aim, I suggest, is the pursuit of true belief."
Comment: different methods are adopted by different communities; that
The unifying aim, I
suggest, is the pursuit of true belief.
Page 29, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Why do epistemic agents parade their favored methods or practices under the banner of truth? The obvious explanation is that others will deny epistemic authority to a method unless they are persuaded, rightly or wrongly, that it meets the standard of truth conduciveness. In other words, truth conduciveness is the presumptive ground for epistemic authorization. Epistemic practices differ so dramatically throughout history and across cultures that it is often hard to credit the notion that these practices were commonly motivated, or at least rationalized, by truth considerations. rationalizations were in fact quite extensive. This is not to deny the pursuit of power across human culture and history, but that should not blind us to a coexisting interest in truth,"
Comment: Why do epistemic agents parade their favored methods or practices under
the banner of truth? The obvious explanation is that others will deny epistemic authority to a method unless they are persuaded, rightly or wrongly, that it meets the standard of
truth conduciveness. In other words, truth conduciveness is the presumptive ground for
epistemic authorization.
Epistemic practices differ so dramatically throughout history and across cultures that it is
often hard to credit the notion that these practices were commonly motivated, or at least
rationalized, by truth considerations.
rationalizations were in fact quite extensive. This is not to deny the pursuit of power
across human culture and history, but that should not blind us to a coexisting interest in
truth,
Page 29, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "law of proof, aspired to achieve the same level of certainty as had been accorded to the earlier methods. the standard of proof was so high that it was difficult to obtain convictions of the guilty."
Comment: law of proof,
aspired to achieve the same level
of certainty as had been accorded to the earlier methods.
the standard of proof was so high that
it was difficult to obtain convictions of the guilty.
Page 29, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Torture was permitted when a so-called “half proof” was established against the suspect, meaning either one eyewitness or circumstantial evidence of substantial gravity."
Comment: Torture was permitted when a so-called “half proof” was established against
the suspect, meaning either one eyewitness or circumstantial evidence of substantial
gravity.
Page 30, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Bizarre as we now find it, the method of torture seems to have been motivated by a concern for truth, constrained by the requirement that new procedures comply with tradition."
Comment: Bizarre as we
now find it, the method of torture seems to have been motivated by a concern for truth,
constrained by the requirement that new procedures comply with tradition.
Page 30, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "A widespread concern for matters of evidence and reliability (truth conduciveness) seems to be presentin all languages. Moreover, in a certain range of languages drawn from quite different families, grammar requires that the warrant for a claim be indicated by citing a channel of evidence, such as perceptual evidence, testimonial evidence, or inferential evidence "
Comment: A widespread
concern for matters of evidence and reliability (truth conduciveness) seems to be presentin all languages. Moreover, in a certain range of languages drawn from quite different
families, grammar requires that the warrant for a claim be indicated by citing a channel
of evidence, such as perceptual evidence, testimonial evidence, or inferential evidence
Page 30, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: " truth is a central concern of many cultures including prescientific ones. various African ethnophilosophies conceive of knowledge in terms of truth. Other studies suggest that the desire for truth occupies a central role in workaday cognitive practices such as magic, divination, and religion. "
Comment: truth is a central concern of many cultures including prescientific ones.
various African
ethnophilosophies conceive of knowledge in terms of truth. Other studies suggest that the desire for truth occupies a central role in workaday cognitive practices such as magic,
divination, and religion.
Page 30, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Horton (1982) claims that African and non-African cultures use magic, religion, and divination to discover the underlying system of natural and supernatural forces with the hope of successfully predicting and intervening in this system. Central to their endeavorsis the belief that practical success turns upon truthful apprehension. "
Comment: Horton (1982) claims that African and non-African cultures use magic, religion, and
divination to discover the underlying system of natural and supernatural forces with the
hope of successfully predicting and intervening in this system. Central to their endeavorsis the belief that practical success turns upon truthful apprehension.
Page 30, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Religious practices are likewise truth oriented, according to Frazer. Truth is necessary for practical success, since false notions incur divine wrath. "
Comment: Religious practices are likewise truth oriented,
according to Frazer. Truth is necessary for practical success, since false notions incur divine wrath.
Page 30, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Turner writes that modes of divination are regarded as both lie-detecting and truth-discovering instruments, which people use in order to undertake remedial measures or to restore individual or collective peace of mind"
Comment: Turner writes that modes of divination are regarded
as both lie-detecting and truth-discovering instruments, which people use in order to
undertake remedial measures or to restore individual or collective peace of mind
Page 31, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "in contemporary South Africa a Truth and Reconciliation Commission has been established by the post-apartheid government to bring out the truth about atrocities committed by all sides in the struggle over white rule."
Comment: in contemporary South Africa a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission has been established by the post-apartheid
government to bring out the truth about atrocities committed by all sides in the struggle
over white rule.
Page 31, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "There is ample evidence, then, that truth is a vital concern of humankind across history and culture, not an idiosyncratic concern of modern white Europeans. a single concept of truth seems to be crossculturally present. It is eminently reasonable, then, for a discipline to be devoted to the systematic and criticalevaluation of truth-oriented practices. "
Comment: There is ample evidence, then, that truth is a vital concern of humankind across history
and culture, not an idiosyncratic concern of modern white Europeans.
a single concept of truth seems to be crossculturally present. It is
eminently reasonable, then, for a discipline to be devoted to the systematic and criticalevaluation of truth-oriented practices.
Page 31, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "1.8 The Argument from Domination"
Comment: 1.8 The Argument from Domination
Page 31, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "(5) Appeals to truth are merely instruments of domination or repression, and should be replaced by practices with progressive social value."
Comment: (5) Appeals to truth are merely instruments of domination or repression, and should be
replaced by practices with progressive social value.
Page 31, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "associated with Michel Foucault, echoed by many movements, including postmodern feminism. Foucault (1979) contended that the sciences of man arose from practices of social domination, including “carceral” practices involving prisons and punishment and sexual confessional practices involved in psychotherapy and medical procedures. The interest in knowledge was driven by concerns for management and power:"
Comment: associated with Michel
Foucault,
echoed by many movements, including postmodern feminism.
Foucault (1979) contended that the sciences of man
arose from practices of social domination, including “carceral” practices involving
prisons and punishment and sexual confessional practices involved in psychotherapy and
medical procedures. The interest in knowledge was driven by concerns for management
and power:
Page 31, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Knowable man (soul, individuality, consciousness, conduct, whatever it is called) is the object-effect of this analytic investment, of this domination-observation. (1979: 305)"
Comment: Knowable man (soul,
individuality, consciousness, conduct, whatever it is called) is the object-effect of this
analytic investment, of this domination-observation. (1979: 305)
Page 31, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Knowledge was essential to rehabilitate the criminal, so that what had been primarily a legal and political matter became invested with new dimensions of scientific knowledge, which served the end of “bio-power.” Political technologies advance by taking what is essentially a political problem, removing it from a realm of political discourse, and recasting it in the neutral language of science."
Comment: Knowledge was essential to
rehabilitate the criminal, so that what had been primarily a legal and political matter
became invested with new dimensions of scientific knowledge, which served the end of
“bio-power.”
Political technologies advance by taking what is essentially a political problem, removing
it from a realm of political discourse, and recasting it in the neutral language of science.
Page 32, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: " the language of reform is, from the outset, an essential component of these political technologies. "
Comment: the language of reform is, from the outset, an essential component of these political technologies.
Page 32, Highlight (Green):
Content: "Bio-power spread under the banner of making people healthy and protecting them."
Comment: Bio-power spread under the
banner of making people healthy and protecting them.
Page 32, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "We are promised normalization and happiness through science and law. When they fail, this only justifies the need for more of the same. Postmodern feminists argue that the ideal of rationality—and with it, presumably, the goal of truth—is really a masculine ideal, advanced as a vehicle for marginalizing, dominating, and silencing women, who by nature, it was alleged, do not partake of rationality."
Comment: We are promised
normalization and happiness through science and law. When they fail, this only justifies
the need for more of the same.
Postmodern feminists argue that the ideal of
rationality—and with it, presumably, the goal of truth—is really a masculine ideal,
advanced as a vehicle for marginalizing, dominating, and silencing women, who by
nature, it was alleged, do not partake of rationality.
Page 32, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "deserving of neglect. the fact that appeals to truth are used as instruments of power or domination does not imply that truth is either nonexistent or"
Comment: deserving of neglect.
the fact that appeals to truth are used
as instruments of power or domination does not imply that truth is either nonexistent or
Page 32, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The way to combat such appeals is to correct the errors and inaccuracies."
Comment: The way to combat such appeals is to correct the errors
and inaccuracies.
Page 32, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Two important alternatives to postmodern feminism are feminist empiricism and feminist standpoint theories.21"
Comment: Two important alternatives to postmodern feminism are feminist
empiricism and feminist standpoint theories.21
Page 32, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Feminist empiricists maintain that sexism and androcentrism are identifiable biases of knowers that can be eliminated by stricter application of scientific and philosophical methodologies. Feminist standpoint theorists reject the notion of an “unmediated” truth (which they associate with empiricism), and emphasize the role of social position in shaping understanding. However, they argue thatthe social position of the oppressed can pierce ideological obfuscation and facilitate a correct understanding of the world.22 "
Comment: Feminist empiricists maintain that sexism and androcentrism are identifiable biases of knowers that can be eliminated by stricter
application of scientific and philosophical methodologies. Feminist standpoint theorists
reject the notion of an “unmediated” truth (which they associate with empiricism), and
emphasize the role of social position in shaping understanding. However, they argue thatthe social position of the oppressed can pierce ideological obfuscation and facilitate a
correct understanding of the world.22
Page 33, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The need to base political progressiveness on truth is equally pressing in other domains."
Comment: The need to base political progressiveness on truth is equally pressing in other domains.
Page 33, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "traditional lawsor legal procedures concerning rape have rested on falsehoods men believe. This formulation presupposes a distinction between truth and falsity. "
Comment: traditional lawsor legal procedures concerning rape have rested on falsehoods men believe. This
formulation presupposes a distinction between truth and falsity.
Page 33, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "feminist theories frequently assert social creation or construction of certain roles. is derivative from, and depends upon, the entrenchment of prior social—rather than natural—practices."
Comment: feminist theories frequently assert
social creation or construction of certain roles.
is derivative from, and depends upon, the entrenchment
of prior social—rather than natural—practices.
Page 34, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "the strength of the theories depends essentially on the truth values of the causal claims."
Comment: the strength of the theories depends essentially on the truth values of the causal
claims.
Page 34, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "only a segment of truth discourse is alleged tobe an instrument of domination, so it makes little sense to issue a general prohibition against truth claims. "
Comment: only a segment of truth discourse is alleged tobe an instrument of domination, so it makes little sense to issue a general prohibition
against truth claims.
Page 34, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "And if there is no general prohibition against truth claims, there is surely a place for truth-oriented epistemology, which concerns itself with the promotion of true claims (and beliefs) as contradistinguished from the false."
Comment: And if there is no general prohibition against truth claims, there is
surely a place for truth-oriented epistemology, which concerns itself with the promotion
of true claims (and beliefs) as contradistinguished from the false.
Page 34, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The issue becomes stickier when truth claims are claims to moral truth, if the claim is one of superior scientific knowledge, for example, such a claim might be warranted in itself, but could not justify any form of oppression, domination, or imperialism. 1.9 The Argument from Bias"
Comment: The issue becomes stickier when truth claims are claims
to moral truth,
if the claim is one of
superior scientific knowledge, for example, such a claim might be warranted in itself, but
could not justify any form of oppression, domination, or imperialism.
1.9 The Argument from Bias
Page 35, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "(6) Truth cannot be attained because all putatively truth-oriented practices are corrupted and biased by politics or self-serving interests."
Comment: (6) Truth cannot be attained because all putatively truth-oriented practices are corrupted
and biased by politics or self-serving interests.
Page 35, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The argument seems to rest on two assumptions: that all belief is driven by motivational biases, and that there is always a conflict between these biases and the pursuit of truth. Both assumptions are highly questionable."
Comment: The argument seems to rest on two assumptions: that all belief is driven by motivational
biases, and that there is always a conflict between these biases and the pursuit of truth.
Both assumptions are highly questionable.
Page 35, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "It says that truth cannot be attained—that is, believed—because people's beliefs are swayed by their own politics and interests. This assumes that belief is controlled by one's motives, a claim that is open to challenge. belief is not voluntary in the way that behavior is voluntary. "
Comment: It says that truth cannot be attained—that is, believed—because
people's beliefs are swayed by their own politics and interests. This assumes that belief is
controlled by one's motives, a claim that is open to challenge.
belief is not voluntary in the way that behavior is voluntary.
Page 35, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: " I am not saying that personal motives never influence belief, only that their impact is indirect and not always determinative. "
Comment: I am not saying that personal motives never influence belief, only that their impact is indirect and not always determinative.
Page 35, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "The second assumption of criticism (6) is that personal motives invariably run counter to getting the truth. also wildly implausible. Dupery would only follow if hearers were universally gullible. The allure of generalizations like (6) arises from preoccupation with political domains, where the best case can be made for conflict between interest and truth (at least truth speaking). But epistemology is concerned with all domains, and facile generalizations based on a restricted sector of domains cannot be accepted Although speaking the truth may sometimes cut against one's interest, it is less common for knowing the truth to do so."
Comment: The second assumption of criticism (6) is that personal motives invariably run counter to
getting the truth.
also wildly implausible.
Dupery would
only follow if hearers were universally gullible. The allure of generalizations like (6)
arises from preoccupation with political domains, where the best case can be made for conflict between interest and truth (at least truth speaking). But epistemology is
concerned with all domains, and facile generalizations based on a restricted sector of
domains cannot be accepted
Although speaking the truth
may sometimes cut against one's interest, it is less common for knowing the truth to do
so.
Page 35, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "there is no necessary conflict between private interests of scientists and the search for truth."
Comment: there is no necessary conflict between private interests of scientists and
the search for truth.
Page 36, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "it is quite unclear that logical gaps between theory and evidence must be filled by motives and interests"
Comment: it is quite unclear that logical gaps between theory and evidence must be filled by
motives and interests
Page 36, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "causal efficacy requires the counterfactual thesis that the beliefs would not have occurred had the politics or interests of the situation been different.23 although case studies sometimes make a plausible case for the role of politics and interests in the initial development of certain ideas, it is rarely shown that the acceptance of these ideas—especially over a long period of time— stemmed from similar motivations."
Comment: causal efficacy requires the counterfactual thesis that the beliefs would not
have occurred had the politics or interests of the situation been different.23
although case studies sometimes make a plausible case for the role of
politics and interests in the initial development of certain ideas, it is
rarely shown that the acceptance of these ideas—especially over a long period of time—
stemmed from similar motivations.
Page 36, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "a social program eugenics,"
Comment: a social program
eugenics,
Page 36, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Eugenics identified “civic worth” with “mental ability,” Galton, explicitly wrote in terms of replacing religious authority with a “scientific priesthood.” Suppose Mackenzie is right that interests drove Galton and Pearson to think up and deploy their statistical techniques. It seems extremely unlikely that the continued acceptance of these techniques, applied by many practitioners to a vast array of problems, can be explained in terms of the same sorts of politics or interests that motivated Galton and Pearson."
Comment: Eugenics identified “civic
worth” with “mental ability,”
Galton,
explicitly wrote in terms of replacing religious authority with a “scientific priesthood.”
Suppose
Mackenzie is right that interests drove Galton and Pearson to think up and deploy their
statistical techniques.
It seems extremely unlikely that the continued acceptance of these
techniques, applied by many practitioners to a vast array of problems, can be explained in
terms of the same sorts of politics or interests that motivated Galton and Pearson.
Page 37, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Mackenzie a ‘strong’ version of sociology of science which holds that social influences can affect the content of even good science, not just bad science. "
Comment: Mackenzie
a ‘strong’ version of sociology of science which holds that social influences can affect the content
of even good science, not just bad science.
Page 37, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "politics and interests do not inevitably hinder truthattainment, but can sometimes promote it. Proponents of the interests approach to science studies commonly seek to show how interests corrupt or threaten the quality of science, trouble is that their selection of cases is frequently biased. The argument from historical case studies also poses a problem of reflexivity. all the central arguments against veritism that spring from postmodern and constructivist quarters have failed. What, exactly, is truth? Two Truth 2.1 Approaches to the Theory of Truth"
Comment: politics and interests do not inevitably hinder truthattainment, but can sometimes promote it.
Proponents of the
interests approach to science studies commonly seek to show how interests corrupt or threaten the quality of science,
trouble is that their selection of cases is frequently biased.
The argument from historical case studies also poses a problem of reflexivity.
all the central arguments against veritism that spring from postmodern
and constructivist quarters have failed.
What, exactly, is
truth?
Two Truth
2.1 Approaches to the Theory of Truth
Page 38, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "What is the aim of a theory of truth? primary aim is to explain what is meant by “truth,”"
Comment: What is the aim of a theory of truth?
primary aim is to explain what is meant by “truth,”
Page 38, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "the primary aim of a truththeory is to define the phrase “true,” or say how it functions in language. "
Comment: the primary aim of a truththeory is to define the phrase “true,” or say how it functions in language.
Page 38, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "secondary project in the theory of truth is to say something about the nature of truth,"
Comment: secondary project in the theory of truth is to say something about the nature of truth,
Page 38, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "something about the truth property (if it is a property) shy of giving a definition."
Comment: something about the truth property (if it is a property) shy of giving a definition.
Page 38, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "there might be informative things to say about truth that do not constitute definitions. "
Comment: there might be informative things to say about truth that do not constitute definitions.
Page 38, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "Another historically prominent mission concerning truth is the attempt to provide a criterion or test of truth,"
Comment: Another historically prominent mission concerning truth is the attempt to provide a criterion or test of truth,
Page 38, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "entirely independent of the definitional project."
Comment: entirely independent of the
definitional project.
Page 38, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "That is the task of another sector of epistemology: the theory of evidence, justification, or truth determination. "
Comment: That is the task of another sector of epistemology: the theory of evidence, justification, or truth determination.
Page 38, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "here we focus on a prior question: what does it even mean to say (or believe) of a proposition that it is true?"
Comment: here we focus on a prior question: what does it even mean to say (or
believe) of a proposition that it is true?
Page 38, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "the aim of the theory of truth is to elucidate the meaning of truth without trying to identify tests for truth, or modes of determining a proposition's truth-value."
Comment: the aim of the
theory of truth is to elucidate the meaning of truth without trying to identify tests for
truth, or modes of determining a proposition's truth-value.
Page 38, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "correspondence theory. a proposition (or sentence, statement, belief, etc.) is true just in case there exists a fact or state of affairs that corresponds to it Opponents of the correspondence theory complain that “worldly” facts are dubious entities and thatcorrespondence is a metaphysically mysterious relation. A subsidiary complaint is that it makes truth too remote andinaccessible to mere human mortals"
Comment: correspondence theory.
a proposition (or sentence, statement, belief, etc.) is true just in case there exists a fact or state of affairs that corresponds to it
Opponents of the
correspondence theory complain that “worldly” facts are dubious entities and thatcorrespondence is a metaphysically mysterious relation. A subsidiary complaint
is that it makes truth too remote andinaccessible to mere human mortals
Page 39, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "alternatives in the field to the correspondence theory."
Comment: alternatives in the field
to the correspondence theory.
Page 39, Highlight (Yellow):
Content: "2.2 Instrumentalism and Relativism"
Comment: 2.2 Instrumentalism and Relativism
--
Marked up using iAnnotate on my iPad
Sent from my iPad. Please forgive typos.
Diana Ascher